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ERITREA: THE SIEGE STATE 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Eritrea has been deeply troubled since independence in 
1991. Following the devastating war with Ethiopia (1998-
2000), an authoritarian, militarised regime has further 
tightened political space, tolerating neither opposition nor 
dissent. Relations are difficult with the region and the 
wider international community. At African Union (AU) 
behest, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions in 
2009 for its support of the Somali Islamic insurgency. It 
has become, in effect, a siege state, whose government 
is suspicious of its own population, neighbours and the 
wider world. Economically crippled at birth, it is a poor 
country from which tens of thousands of youths are flee-
ing, forming large asylum-seeking communities in Europe 
and North America. But Eritrea is an extreme reflection 
of its region’s rough political environment, not its sole 
spoiler. More effort to understand the roots of its suspi-
cions and greater engagement rather than further isolation 
would be a more promising international prescription for 
dealing with the genuine risks it represents. 
The militarism and authoritarianism which now define 
the political culture have their roots in the region’s vio-
lent history. The 30-year war of independence was part of 
a network of conflicts which devastated north-east Africa. 
The real significance of that legacy has only become clear 
in the last decade, as President Isaias Afwerki and a small 
cohort of ex-fighters have strengthened their grip on power, 
while suppressing social freedoms and economic devel-
opment in favour of an agenda centred on an obedient 
national unity and the notion that Eritrea is surrounded by 
enemies. Isaias’s supporters, diminishing in number, as-
sert that only he has the vision to guide it through difficult 
times; the growing ranks of his critics argue that he has 
hijacked the nation-building process; betrayed the sacri-
fice of hundreds of thousands who achieved and defended 
independence, and brought ruin to the country. 
Conditions are worsening dramatically. Since the 2001 
crackdown that ended a brief period of public debate, jails 
have been filled with political prisoners and critics, reli-
gious dissidents, journalists, draft evaders and failed es-
capees. Isaias uses the standoff with Ethiopia to justify 
severe internal discipline and military adventures across 
the region. Ethiopia has reneged on part of the Algiers 
Agreement that ended the war, in particular by not ac-
cepting what was to have been a special commission’s 
binding decision on the border. The Security Council’s 
failure to compel compliance reinforced the sense in Asmara 
that the international community is inherently hostile. Eri-
trea subsequently placed restrictions on UN peacekeepers 
that led to their withdrawal in 2008 from the demilitarised 
zone between the belligerents, citing total lack of coop-
eration. Isaias’s foreign policy became even more fixated 
on forcing Ethiopia to accept the border decision, with 
proxy warfare rather than conventional diplomacy the 
favoured tool. 
Militarised politics has spilled into foreign policy, the lat-
ter frequently involving armed responses and aggressive 
adventurism at the expense of conventional diplomacy. 
To date, Eritrea has fought, directly or indirectly, with 
Ethiopia, Yemen, Djibouti and Sudan and involved itself 
in various ways in the conflicts in eastern Sudan, Darfur 
and Somalia. While it asserts that it is pursuing legitimate 
national security interests and lambasts the U.S. in par-
ticular for intervening in the affairs of others, the aggres-
sive approach and abrasive tone have left it increasingly 
isolated. The willingness of potential friends to consider 
the legitimacy of at least some of its concerns is dimin-
ished by Eritrea’s unwillingness to demilitarise its foreign 
policy and to make concessions on any level. 
The economy has been shattered by the vagaries of re-
gional rainfall, the state’s destruction of the private sector 
and the huge costs of military mobilisation. Society more 
broadly is under enormous strain. Remarkably, there have 
not yet been serious protests, but pressure is building, 
both inside the borders and in the extensive diaspora, 
whose remittances have been a major financial support. A 
range of external opposition groups – though still deeply 
divided – are lining up against the regime.  
To avoid a fresh crisis in the Horn of Africa, the interna-
tional community and the Eritreans alike will need to 
demonstrate a new level of imagination and flexibility. 
It is vital that the international community engages with 
Eritrea, politically and economically, and rigorously as-
sesses the country’s internal problems as well as its external 
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pressures. Development assistance and improved trade 
links should be tied to holding long-promised national 
elections and implementing the long-delayed constitution. 
At the same time, in particular the UN Security Council 
should pressure Ethiopia to accept the border ruling. All this 
is necessary to prevent another failed state from emerging 
in the Horn. That outcome is otherwise distinctly possible 
given the widespread lack of support for the government 
within the country and the deteriorating state of the army, 
whose ability to either sustain Isaias Afwerki’s regime or 
to successfully manage regime transition is increasingly 
questionable. 
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 September 2010
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ERITREA: THE SIEGE STATE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Almost twenty years ago, Eritrea became Africa’s newest 
country – de facto in 1991, when the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) entered Asmara in triumph, and 
de jure in 1993, following a UN-sponsored referendum 
on independence. At the time, there was optimism that 
northeast Africa might finally achieve political and eco-
nomic stability, and regional development might be founded 
upon a new relationship between Eritrea and Ethiopia. 
Within a few years, however, there was heightened re-
pression inside Eritrea and a devastating return to war 
with Ethiopia. 
Covering about 125,000 sq km and with a population of 
some 5.5 million, Eritrea is a fraction of the size of its 
main neighbours, Ethiopia and Sudan, but it contains con-
siderable diversity.1 Broadly, it is divided between the 
highlands – including the central plateau (the kebessa) 
and the rugged mountains to the north – and the lowlands 
to the west, the coastal plain and the Danakil desert to the 
south. It is ethnically and religiously mixed, with nine 
official ethnic groups and large Muslim, Orthodox Chris-
tian, Roman Catholic and Protestant communities. The 
bulk of the population lives in the central highlands. Re-
gardless of its small size, it occupies a critical geopolitical 
position in the region, including some 1,150km of Red 
Sea coastline – and it is this which has shaped much of its 
troubled history. 
Created in a contested and volatile region, first as an Ital-
ian colony and then as an Ethiopian province, Eritrea’s 
defining experience has primarily been violent instability 
and political conflict. The political culture of the EPLF 
has its roots in the liberation struggle against Ethiopia 
(1961-1991). Engaged in a life and death struggle, its 
leadership has long been intolerant of internal dissent and 
external opposition, and it forged its political program – 
essentially that of a state in waiting – during the years 
when its rear base was in the harsh northern mountains. 
The EPLF’s character evolved in those formative years – 
 
 
1 Ethiopia is 1.1 million sq km and has an estimated population 
of 88 million. Sudan is 2.5 million sq km and has about 42 
million people. 
the early- and mid-1970s – through its elimination of ri-
vals during the civil war and ultimately its defeat of the 
Ethiopian Derg regime in 1991.2 After a brief respite with 
independence, it became increasingly oppressive, particu-
larly following the 2001 crackdown.  
Eritrea today is defined by military or national service 
and by a culture of militarism that profoundly impacts its 
politics, society and economy, causes the fragility which 
characterises national life and affects foreign policy and 
the stability of the surrounding region. It has had troubled 
and frequently violent relations with all its neighbours, 
including interventions in Darfur and Somalia and conflict 
with Yemen and Djibouti, as well as, more famously, with 
the governments in Khartoum and Addis Ababa. Above 
all, its relations with and perceptions of Ethiopia are fun-
damental to an understanding of much of its behaviour. 
Because Eritrea’s internal stability and external relations 
will have much wider implications in north-east Africa 
and the Red Sea region, this report seeks to trace the 
routes by which Eritrea has come to be as it is today, ex-
amining both internal autocracy and aggressive foreign 
policy. It draws upon more than ten years of work on and 
field research in the country. Given the government’s re-
strictions – most foreigners are not allowed to travel out-
side of Asmara – no field work was conducted in Eritrea 
during the current year. Crisis Group has attempted to fill 
that gap through interviews with a wide range of Eritre-
ans who have recently left the country (or are travelling 
abroad), as well as diplomats, aid workers and others who 
have recently been active in Eritrea.3 Except as otherwise 
indicated in the text or the footnotes, conclusions expressed 
are the result of that direct work by Crisis Group. 
 
 
2 The Derg, which means “committee” or “council” in Amharic, 
was the socialist military junta that came to power in Ethiopia 
following the ousting of Emperor Haile Selassie I. It formally 
ended in 1987, but its chairman, Mengistu Haile Mariam, re-
tained power as the president of a new government until he was 
overthrown four years later. 
3 Crisis Group shared an advance copy of the report with the 
Eritrean authorities prior to publication. 
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II. THE MAKING OF INDEPENDENT 
ERITREA 
A. THE FOUNDATION  
Eritrea’s roots lie in the contests between several ex-
panding states in the late 1880s and early 1890s, chiefly 
between the Italians on the Red Sea coast and the Am-
hara-Tigrayan state – the nucleus of modern Ethiopia – 
that was extending its reach over the northern highland 
plateau.4 To the west was the Mahdist state in Sudan 
while the British, French and Italians were staking territo-
rial claims in the hot southern plains of the Afar and the 
Somali. The Italians used Eritrea as a springboard to in-
vade Ethiopia but were defeated at the battle of Adwa in 
1896. However, Emperor Menelik eschewed an advance 
to the coast in favour of consolidation, so he decided to 
recognise the Italian colony of Eritrea.5 The Italians had 
better success in the mid-1890s against the Mahdists, 
pushing their new colony’s western boundary into the 
Sudanese lowlands. In the course of the late 1890s and 
early 1900s, a series of agreements established the mod-
ern borders of Eritrea, bounded by Ethiopia and French 
Somaliland (Djibouti) to the south and Anglo-Egyptian 
Sudan to the west and north. Stretches of these frontiers, 
however, remained unmarked on the ground. 
Although a light manufacturing base did emerge, colonial 
Eritrea experienced limited economic development and 
never attracted the large numbers of Italian settlers initially 
envisaged.6 After a major uprising in 1894, the Italians 
imposed a relative peace that lasted into the 1920s, in 
large part by governing through local chiefs and acting 
cautiously in the expropriation of land for commercial 
purposes. However, low-level resistance rumbled on 
throughout the half-century of Italian administration, of-
ten in the form of banditry. These attacks were not always 
explicitly anti-colonial but rather reflected local dynamics 
and patterns of violence, notably cattle-raiding and inter-
community feuds.7 At times the Italians also struggled to 
 
 
4 For example, G. N. Sanderson, “The Nile Basin and the East-
ern Horn, 1870-1908”, in R. Oliver and G. N. Sanderson (eds.), 
The Cambridge History of Africa: from 1870 to 1905 (Cam-
bridge, 1985), Vol. 6; S. Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian 
Independence (London, 1976). 
5 S. Rubenson, “Adwa 1896: The Resounding Protest”, in R. 
Rotberg and A. Mazrui (eds.), Protest and Power in Black Af-
rica (New York, 1970). 
6 Redie Bereketeab, Eritrea: The Making of a Nation, 1890-
1991 (Trenton, 2007); R. Caulk, “Ethiopia and the Horn”, in A. 
D. Roberts (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa: from 1905 
to 1940 (Cambridge, 1986), Vol. 7. 
7 R. Caulk, “‘Black Snake, White Snake’: Bahta Hagos and his 
Revolt Against Italian Overrule in Eritrea, 1894”, and T. 
Fernyhough, “Social Mobility and Dissident Elites in Northern 
maintain control of the borders, including with Sudan and 
Ethiopia. Nonetheless, the enduring impact of colonial 
rule was the fostering of some sense, often ill-defined, of 
a distinctive Eritrean identity.8 The Italian era was the 
main reference point for later efforts by nationalists to 
emphasise distinctiveness from the neighbouring Ethio-
pian empire.9 
In the early- and mid-1930s, tens of thousands of Italian 
soldiers arrived in the build-up to Mussolini’s invasion of 
Ethiopia. This period also witnessed significant urban 
development and the imposition of race laws regulating 
“native” society. Those laws notwithstanding, many Eri-
treans served in the Italian forces that invaded Ethiopia in 
October 1935.10 Urbanisation and military service con-
tributed to the development of an Eritrean national iden-
tity. 
Italy’s occupation of Ethiopia was brief and troubled, 
and Eritrea’s days as an Italian colony were numbered. In 
1941 Allied forces defeated the Italians in the region, and 
Eritrea came under a British Military Administration 
(BMA). Charged with stabilising the volatile territory 
pending decisions on its future, British stewardship facili-
tated a degree of public debate between newly-founded 
political parties and through the brief flourishing of 
newspapers, in English, Tigrinya and Arabic. While an 
Eritrean elite pondered the future of the territory, a Four 
Power Commission, comprising representatives of the 
main wartime allies, was dispatched. The status of the 
Italian territories – including Eritrea, Somalia and Libya – 
was one of the key issues in the post-war dispensation of 
power.11 
When the Four Power Commission was unable to reach a 
decision, the Eritrean question was referred to the UN, 
which sent a mission in 1948 to ascertain the wishes of 
the population, by this time divided along a spectrum be-
tween outright independence and unconditional union 
with Ethiopia. Eritrean Muslims broadly favoured inde-
pendence, having long been the target of raids by Chris-
 
 
Ethiopia: The Role of Banditry, 1900-1969”, both in D. Crum-
mey (ed.), Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa 
(London, 1986). 
8 This was most present in certain population groups – notably 
the Tigrinya highlanders – and certain socio-economic sectors, 
particularly thousands of Eritreans who served as ascari (colo-
nial troops). 
9 Ruth Iyob, The Eritrean Struggle for Independence: Domina-
tion, Resistance, Nationalism, 1941-1993 (Cambridge, 1995); 
Redie Bereketeab, Eritrea; R. Pateman, Eritrea: Even the 
Stones are Burning (Lawrenceville, 1998). 
10 A. Mockler, Haile Selassie’s War: The Italian-Ethiopian 
Campaign, 1935-1941 (New York, 1984). 
11 Okbazghi Yohannes, Eritrea, a Pawn in World Politics 
(Gainesville, 1991). 
Eritrea: The Siege State 
Crisis Group Africa Report N°163, 21 September 2010 Page 3 
 
 
tian Ethiopians and fearing Orthodox Church domination. 
The Tigrinya-speaking Christian highlanders were di-
vided between independence and union with Ethiopia. By 
the late 1940s, two broad groupings – the pro-Ethiopia 
Unionist Party and the separatist Independence Bloc – 
faced one another in an increasingly tense and violent po-
litical environment; the debates of the era demonstrated 
the deep fissures between communities and regions, and 
political violence – mostly by unionists against those fa-
vouring independence – increased markedly.12 
Meanwhile, international considerations were proving 
more influential than local desires and aspirations. The 
UN commission, under pressure from the U.S., finally 
recommended the compromise of federation, whereby 
Eritrea would become an autonomous territory, with a 
separate legislative assembly, within Ethiopia. In exchange 
for their support, Emperor Haile Selassie’s government 
granted the Americans a military base in Asmara. Ulti-
mately, Eritrean wishes were set aside in favour of Wash-
ington’s interests in the region. 
The federation came into effect in 1952, but from the outset 
Ethiopia sought to undermine it. Addis gradually weak-
ened the powers of the assembly, and it was eventually 
reduced to rubber-stamping the emperor’s decrees, com-
municated by his representative in Asmara. The govern-
ment also dismantled other aspects of autonomy, such as 
replacing Tigrinya and Arabic with Amharic and substi-
tuting the Ethiopian flag for the Eritrean. It was swiftly 
clear that there was no intention to honour the terms of 
the federal constitution, and Haile Selassie’s increasingly 
aggressive infringements drove ever larger numbers of 
Eritreans – highland and lowland, Christian and Muslim 
alike – into the pro-independence movement. Political 
resistance began to be better organised, inspired in part by 
models of nationalism elsewhere in the region, notably 
Sudan.13 Finally, in 1962, the Ethiopian government for-
mally abrogated the federation, and the Eritrean Assem-
bly – with Ethiopian soldiers surrounding the buildings – 
voted itself out of existence. 
Under the terms of the federal constitution, the UN Secu-
rity Council should have stepped in to protect Eritrean 
autonomy, but it failed to do so, and Ethiopia annexed 
 
 
12 L. Ellingson, “The Emergence of Political Parties in Eritrea, 
1941-1950”, Journal of African History, 18:2 (1977); Iyob, Eri-
trean Struggle, op. cit.; G. K. N. Trevaskis, Eritrea: A Colony 
in Transition (London, 1960). 
13 Jordan Gebre-Medhin, Peasants and Nationalism in Eritrea: 
A Critique of Ethiopian Studies (Trenton, 1989); T. Killion, 
“Eritrean workers’ organisation and early nationalist mobilisa-
tion: 1948-1958”, Eritrean Studies Review, 2:1 (1997); Wolde-
Yesus Ammar, “The Role of Asmara Students in the Eritrean 
Nationalist Movement, 1958-1968”, Eritrean Studies Review, 
2:1 (1997). 
Eritrea with barely a murmur of international protest.14 
Two enduring beliefs branded themselves on the national-
ist imagination as a result. The first was that Ethiopia was 
an enemy, which would stop at nothing to eradicate Eri-
trean identity and so could never be trusted. The second 
was that the international community could likewise never 
be trusted, since it had betrayed the Eritrean people by 
neglecting the principle of self-determination and sacri-
ficing their rights under international law for the sake of 
Western geopolitical advantage. An appreciation of these 
beliefs goes some way to explaining current Eritrean po-
litical culture. 
B. WARS OF LIBERATION 
Even before formal annexation, liberation organisations 
were being established. The Eritrean Liberation Move-
ment (ELM) was founded in Port Sudan in 1958 by Mus-
lims and communist activists, while the Eritrean Liberation 
Front (ELF) became simultaneously active in Cairo.15 
Sharp divisions were clear from the outset. The ELM was 
adept at mobilising support in towns, but the ELF was 
more effective, forming armed units in the western low-
lands and recruiting from the predominantly Muslim Tigre 
and their subgroups in the north and west. By the mid-
1960s, Tigrinya highlanders were also joining, but within 
a few years serious fissures emerged, mainly between 
Christian and Muslim recruits and between young radi-
cals (including Isaias Afwerki) and older leaders. The 
radicals believed Christians were oppressed within the 
ELF and that the ELM was insufficiently revolutionary.16 
Several splinters from the ELF in the early 1970s coalesced 
into the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF).17 The 
EPLF brought together people from various ethnic back-
grounds and included both Christians and Muslims, but 
the core leadership was Tigrinya highlander and quickly 
formed around Isaias.18 
 
 
14 Iyob, Eritrean Struggle, op. cit.; H. Erlich, “The Eritrean 
Autonomy, 1952-1962: Its Failure and its Contribution to Fur-
ther Escalation”, in Y. Dinstein (ed.), Models of Autonomy 
(New York, 1981). 
15 J. Markakis, “The Nationalist Revolution in Eritrea”, Journal 
of Modern African Studies, 26:1 (1988). 1 September 1961 is 
conventionally regarded as the beginning of the armed struggle. 
16 When the ELM decided to change its tactics and launch its 
own armed struggle, in 1965, it was violently crushed by the 
ELF. Iyob, Eritrean Struggle, op. cit., p. 98. 
17 D. Pool, From Guerrillas to Government: the Eritrean Peo-
ple’s Liberation Front (Oxford, 2001) pp. 49-70; Markakis, 
“Nationalist Revolution”, op. cit.; Iyob, Eritrean Struggle, pp. 
109-122, 123-135. 
18 The ELF leadership was also replaced by a younger cohort, 
and both movements were by the mid-1970s led by secret par-
ties with their roots in the 1960s student radicalism of Asmara: 
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The years between the early 1970s and early 1980s wit-
nessed intermittent war between the ELF and the EPLF, 
broken by periods of armistice and military cooperation. 
It was a bloody period still never discussed openly in Eri-
trea.19 Both movements gained recruits, but it was the 
EPLF that was increasingly effective, politically and mili-
tarily. By 1977, the liberation fronts controlled, directly or 
indirectly, the vast bulk of Eritrea outside the major towns. 
The overthrow of Haile Selaisse in 1974 and ensuing 
turmoil had greatly undermined Ethiopia’s military ca-
pacity, but the nationalists suffered a serious setback in 
1978-1979, with the arrival of massive Soviet military 
support for the Marxist Derg regime.20 In the face of 
Ethiopian offensives, the EPLF was forced to carry out 
a “strategic withdrawal” to the northern mountains of 
Sahel, around the town of Nakfa.21 In this stronghold, it 
operated as a state-in-waiting, creating an entire system 
of government and way of life. The EPLF held out 
against further Ethiopian offensives against all odds,22 
and by the mid-1980s was beginning to launch limited 
offensives. In the face of enormous danger and difficulty, 
the EPLF went from strength to strength, both politically 
and militarily. The key to its success was the inculcation 
of a fierce, self-supporting loyalty and the enforcement of 
strict discipline among its fighters. 
While still fighting the Ethiopians, the liberation groups 
continued their internecine struggle. In 1981, the EPLF 
emerged victorious, expelling the ELF into Sudan, after 
which it lost domestic relevance. Thereafter, it set about 
presenting itself as the sole legitimate expression of na-
tionalist aspirations. 
Meanwhile, there were difficult relations with the Tigray 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in northern Ethiopia. 
The TPLF had been created in 1975 with some assistance 
from the EPLF.23 While its initial goal had been to free 
Tigray, it came to regard itself as a vanguard movement 
for the emancipation of Ethiopia as a whole. Despite 
some cooperation during the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
 
 
the Labour Party in the ELF and the Eritrean People’s Revolu-
tionary Party in the EPLF. 
19 Pool, Guerrillas, op. cit., chapter 3. 
20 Andargachew Tiruneh, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974-1987: 
A Transformation from an Aristocratic to a Totalitarian Autoc-
racy (Cambridge, 1993). 
21 Awet Weldemichael, “The Eritrean Long March: The Strate-
gic Withdrawal of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
(EPLF), 1978-79”, Journal of Military History, 73:4 (2009). 
22 D. Connell, Against All Odds: A Chronicle of the Eritrean 
Revolution (Lawrenceville, 1997). 
23 J. Young, Peasant Revolution in Ethiopia: The Tigray Peo-
ple’s Liberation Front, 1975-1991 (Cambridge, 1997). 
there were increasing tensions between the two fronts.24 
They disagreed sharply over military strategy and, more 
importantly, the questions of ethnicity and nationality. 
The TPLF considered Eritrea a multi-national territory, 
within which various groups should be allowed the right 
of secession. It also defined as “Tigrayan” anyone who 
spoke Tigrinya – which included Eritrean speakers of that 
language. 
The EPLF dismissed the idea, arguing that their struggle 
was anti-colonial, and that Eritrea had a distinctive iden-
tity and legal status, and democratic unity made the right 
of secession for Eritrea’s nationalities irrelevant. It dis-
tanced itself from the TPLF’s struggle, dismissing the 
viability of an independent Tigray and urging the TPLF 
to become part of a pan-Ethiopian revolution. The issue 
of several contested points along the Eritrean border could 
not be resolved during the liberation struggle, so was set 
aside; but it would return to haunt the two movements, 
whose relationship was marked by increasing rancour; 
indeed, between 1985 and 1988 their links were severed 
completely. 
By the time relatively normal relations were restored, the 
two fronts were making significant advances against the 
Derg, which was weakened by years of war and famine and 
by the sudden decline of Soviet support. In 1988 the EPLF 
broke out of its rear base, in effect splitting the Ethiopian 
forces in two; further attacks in eastern Eritrea culminated 
in the seizure of the port city of Massawa in early 1990.25 
In the months that followed, the EPLF advanced toward 
Asmara, while the TPLF – now the dominant part of a 
coalition of guerrillas and militias, the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) – swept south 
toward Addis Ababa. In May 1991, the EPLF and TPLF/ 
EPRDF captured Asmara and Addis Ababa respectively 
and set about forming new regimes. 
C. SOVEREIGNTY AND RETURN TO ARMS 
Hopes were initially high that the EPLF could bring po-
litical stability and economic reconstruction, despite mis-
givings some had about the brutal path the movement had 
followed during the armed struggle. It certainly had consid-
erable political capital, which many saw as compensating 
 
 
24 J. Young, “The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts: 
A History of Tensions and Pragmatism”, Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 34:1 (1996); R. J. Reid, “Old Problems in New 
Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with 
Tigray, from Liberation Struggle to Interstate War”, Africa, 
73:3 (2003). 
25 Gebru Tareke, The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of 
Africa (New Haven, 2009). 
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for the country’s material devastation.26 In a 1993 UN-
monitored referendum, 99.8 per cent voted for independence 
from Ethiopia.27 The EPLF took this as popular endorse-
ment of its assumption of power and Isaias as head of 
state. It dissolved itself in early 1994 to become the Peo-
ple’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), the sole 
legal party. 
Although elections were promised, and a commission was 
established to craft a new constitution that would enshrine 
the rights and obligations espoused by the EPLF during 
the struggle, the movement clearly had no intention of re-
linquishing power any time soon or of testing itself against 
serious opposition. This was not necessarily seen as prob-
lematic, at least immediately, since the government was 
widely admired for its vigour, discipline and determina-
tion and thought to be the best for national development.28 
In the interests of peace and stability, many Eritreans and 
foreign observers alike reserved judgement even on early 
human rights abuses and authoritarian tendencies. 
However, worrying trends and problems soon became 
more obvious. The government increasingly clashed with 
foreign non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and neigh-
bouring states and displayed an alarming tendency to 
fight first and talk later. Initially admired as feisty, self-
sufficient and unbeholden to outside influences, the coun-
try quickly came to be seen as bellicose. Particular groups 
were persecuted, and the state attacked those it regarded 
as non-citizens. The once admired tight ship was becom-
ing an oppressive regime with clear disregard for due 
process, disinterested in rights and only concerned with 
obligations.29 The EPLF was still behaving like a guerrilla 
movement with absolute power of life and death over its 
constituents, and its foreign policy was often conducted 
aggressively, even naively. Squeezed between Sudan and 
Ethiopia and in a generally hostile neighbourhood, the 
EPLF did have much to do to make the country secure, 
but its liberation skills needed to be augmented by new 
political and diplomatic proficiency. 
The biggest problem was Ethiopia, now controlled by the 
TPLF/EPRDF, with which the EPLF had for years had 
troubled relations. It appeared for a time that the new 
governments were prepared to open an era of coopera-
tion. Most obviously, Ethiopia gave its public blessing 
to Eritrean independence. Eritrea and Ethiopia had long 
had close economic ties and these seemed set to continue, 
pursuant to agreements made in September 1993 and 
 
 
26 Connell, Against All Odds, op. cit., chapter 15, brilliantly 
captures the spirit of this moment. 
27 Iyob, Eritrean Struggle, op. cit., p. 140. 
28 Pateman, Eritrea: Even the Stones, op. cit., chapters 10 and 11. 
29 For example, see the Eritrea entry in “Amnesty International 
Report 1997”.  
January 1997.30 Economic interdependency was expected 
to strengthen. But a series of disputes escalated through 
the mid-1990s.31 These included clashes at the border and 
the demarcation issue that had been a cause of conflict 
between the EPLF and the TPLF twenty years earlier.32 
The tensions were particularly explosive at Badme, on the 
western border. Relations deteriorated against the back-
drop of Ethiopia’s new landlocked status, brought about 
by the creation of independent Eritrea. 
The Eritreans, as agreed, introduced their own currency, 
the nakfa, in November 1997, but this sparked a trade 
war and increased levels of mutual vitriol. Ethiopia also 
complained bitterly about taxes on its goods at Assab, 
which, though in Eritrea, was to all intents and purposes 
an Ethiopian port, since almost all its cargo came from or 
was destined for that country.33 Many in Addis Ababa 
even began to wonder why Eritrea needed Assab.34 All this 
was exacerbated by deep anger in both countries at per-
ceived slights and threats, past and present: Ethiopians 
believed Eritreans were arrogant and uncooperative; Eri-
treans perceived Ethiopians as untrustworthy and expan-
sionist. When the shooting war erupted in May 1998, it 
swept rapidly out of control. 
The course of the war and the ceasefire that concluded it 
in 2000, once the armies had fought to a standstill, are 
outlined below. The conflict was devastating for Eritrea, 
politically and economically. It shattered any chance for 
significant growth and greatly exacerbated the govern-
ment’s militaristic and authoritarian tendencies. Ethiopia 
now dominates its worldview and external relations, as 
the enemy at the gates, whose actions are seen as proof 
that the international community is perennially hostile and 
routinely fails to appreciate the challenges Eritrea faces. 
 
 
30 Tekeste Negash and K. Tronvoll, Brothers at War: Making 
Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War (Oxford, 2000), appendi-
ces 1 and 2; and Amare Tekle, “The Basis of Eritrean-Ethiopian 
Cooperation”, in Amare Tekle (ed.), Eritrea and Ethiopia: 
From Conflict to Cooperation (Lawrenceville, 1994). 
31 Negash and Tronvoll, Brothers at War, op. cit; D. Jacquin-
Berdal and M. Plaut (eds.), Unfinished Business: Ethiopia and 
Eritrea at war (Lawrenceville, 2005). 
32 Reid, “Old Problems”, op. cit. 
33 D. Styan, “Twisting Ethio-Eritrean Economic Ties: Misper-
ceptions of War and the Misplaced Priorities of Peace, 1997-
2002”, in Jacquin-Berdal and Plaut, Unfinished Business, op. cit. 
34 The issue would grow in intensity. See, for example, the 
speculation over the status of Assab in late 1998, in Negash and 
Tronvoll, Brothers at War, op. cit., p. 72. A Crisis Group ana-
lyst was present in another capacity at a meeting on the region 
in December 2002, where a group of Ethiopian academics de-
clared that Ethiopia wanted nothing to do with Eritrea, but 
“only wants Assab”. 
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE  
MILITARY STATE 
A. THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF  
THE EPLF/PFDJ 
The military state has been several decades in the making, 
and its roots lie in the liberation struggle. The violent dis-
unity of the early armed struggle meant that the political 
culture of the liberation organisations became ever more 
authoritarian and increasingly intolerant of dissent. The 
political structures created within the EPLF were designed 
to deal with internal opposition. The much-discussed 
clampdown on public debate and criticism in September 
2001 was foreshadowed by events within the movement 
nearly 30 years earlier. In 1973 a number of new recruits 
– nicknamed the menqa (“bats”), because they met at 
night – began criticising the leadership, drawing attention 
to its dictatorial tendencies and openly discussing per-
ceived organisational problems of the movement.35 The 
leadership, centred on Isaias, regarded the group as “ul-
tra-left” and swiftly rounded up the leading critics, exe-
cuting some and compelling others to publicly recant. It 
was clear from this point that unity and unquestioning 
loyalty were valued above everything; no significant in-
ternal opposition would be voiced again until after the 
1998-2000 war. 
During the 1970s, the EPLF refined its “democratic cen-
tralism”, under which leadership decisions were filtered 
through the rungs of command to the rank and file and at 
every level were expected to be accepted and followed. 
The central committee was formally established at the 
First Congress of the movement in 1977, where the first 
secretary general, Romedan Mohamed Nur, was appointed 
as a unifying figure, with Isaias as assistant secretary gen-
eral.36 Also chosen was the political bureau, the top tier of 
leadership, to preside over broad branches of the organi-
sation, including administrative departments (ranging 
from health and social affairs to political education and 
intelligence); national unions (of peasants, workers, women, 
students and “professionals”); and the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Army.  
 
 
35 Pool, Guerrillas, op. cit., pp. 76-80; Kidane Mengisteab and 
Okbazghi Yohannes, Anatomy of an African Tragedy: Political, 
Economic and Foreign Policy Crisis in Post-Independence Eri-
trea (Trenton, 2005), pp. 46-54; Gaim Kibreab, Critical Reflec-
tions on the Eritrean War of Independence (Trenton, 2008), pp. 
223-276. 
36 Pool, Guerrillas, op. cit., pp. 82-87. For good analysis of 
early organisation, see David Pool’s other essays, including 
“The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front”, in C. Clapham (ed.), 
African Guerrillas (Oxford, 1998) and “Eritrean Nationalism”, 
in I. M. Lewis (ed.), Nationalism and Self-Determination in the 
Horn of Africa (London, 1983). 
The elements of the front, political and military, reached 
into zonal, sub-zonal and village administrations.37 The 
1987 congress modified this somewhat, reducing the pol-
itburo (from thirteen to nine members) and increasing the 
central committee (from 37 to 71), while Isaias became 
secretary general, changes that increased the top leader-
ship’s authority, in particular that of Isaias.38 
Above all, the EPLF and its political and military opera-
tions were run by a secret party, the Eritrean People’s 
Revolutionary Party (EPRP), whose existence was un-
known to the vast majority of fighters and even most 
leaders until Isaias revealed it at the third congress in 
1994 (the last to date).39 Isaias stated that this “inner 
party” had functioned as a revolutionary vanguard, direct-
ing the wider organisation through its most difficult 
years, until it was disbanded in 1989, when, on the eve of 
independence, many questioned its necessity in view of 
the impending requirements of nation-building. Whether 
the EPRP really was disbanded or simply suspended re-
mains a matter of some debate. It is clear, however, that 
its culture remains. From the mid-1990s and especially 
since 2001, the key decisions have essentially been made 
by the president, not by a cabinet or the defunct national 
assembly.40 Though there is no evidence of a formal inner 
party, Eritrea is run by an amorphous, continually shifting 
group of people surrounding Isaias whose actual rank is 
irrelevant, because their authority stems from whatever 
personal favour he chooses to bestow upon them.41 
The other major decision at the third congress was the 
disbanding of the EPLF and its reconstitution as the Peo-
ple’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ).42 That 
body is the EPLF in everything but name and remains the 
sole legal political party, with Isaias as its chairman as 
well as head of state. 
In the mid-1990s, the government promised to produce a 
constitution, introduce multi-party politics and hold na-
tional elections. A constitutional commission drafted a 
constitution that was ratified by a constituent assembly in 
 
 
37 R. Leonard, “Popular Participation in Liberation and Revolu-
tion”, in L. Cliffe and B. Davidson (eds.), The Long Struggle of 
Eritrea for Independence and Constructive Peace (Trenton, 
1988), p. 116. 
38 Pool, Guerrillas, op. cit., pp. 86-7. 
39 D. Connell, “Inside the EPLF: The Origins of the ‘People’s 
Party’ and its Role in the Liberation of Eritrea”, Review of Afri-
can Political Economy, 89 (2001). 
40 D. Connell, “The EPLF/PFDJ Experience and How it Shapes 
Eritrea’s Regional Strategy”, in R. J. Reid (ed.), Eritrea’s Ex-
ternal Relations: Understanding its Regional Role and Foreign 
Policy (London, 2009), pp. 28-31. 
41 Crisis Group analyst’s interviews in another capacity, As-
mara, July-August 2006 and August 2008. 
42 Connell, “Inside the EPLF”, op. cit. 
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May 1997 but never implemented.43 As with a number of 
other political promises, its neglect was justified by the 
outbreak of war, in 1998, although there was no clear ex-
planation why it gathered dust for months beforehand. A 
national assembly was created in 1993 (and reorganised 
the following year) to which the cabinet was in theory re-
sponsible; it frequently passed resolutions on elections, 
but they were never held. 
During the war, power was concentrated even further. 
Important ministers were excluded from key political and 
military decisions, and the national assembly was never 
consulted. The imperiousness with which Isaias directed 
policy and strategy became a matter of grave concern.44 
During the critical weeks of the third phase of fighting in 
May and June 2000, when Ethiopian forces broke the Eri-
trean lines in the west, Isaias sidelined the defence minis-
try and personally directed operations. Many maintain his 
interference and refusal to consult or delegate was the cause 
of military failures during that period.45 Deep rifts opened 
within the leadership but only later became public. As 
the dust began to settle in the latter half of 2000, critics 
emerged, and vocal opposition grew. 
In October, professionals in the diaspora met in Berlin 
and drafted a letter to Isaias – known as the “Berlin Mani-
festo” – criticising the tendency toward one-man rule.46 
The president met with them in Asmara and dismissed 
their concerns (his contempt for “mere intellectuals” is 
well known), but more serious attacks came late that year 
and in early 2001, as senior liberation war veterans (some 
founding fathers of the EPLF), known as the “Group of 
15” or “G15”, began to voice disquiet over the president’s 
conduct.47 They published an open letter on the internet 
that condemned his high-handed leadership and failure to 
consult the national assembly, especially over the war.48 
Isaias’s circle regarded the critics as having broken a 
cardinal EPLF rule, never to wash dirty linen in public. 
They argued that it was not the time for discussions about 
democracy and elections; indeed, “now is not the time” 
became the defining principle of the regime. 
 
 
43 Yohannes Gebremedhin, The Challenges of a Society in 
Transition: Legal Development in Eritrea (Trenton, 2004). 
44 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, July 2001-August 2002. 
45 D. Connell, Conversations with Eritrean Political Prisoners 
(Trenton, 2005). 
46 Ibid., p. 11. 
47 They waited until after the ceasefire agreement had been 
formally signed in December 2000 to go public. 
48 Connell, Conversations, op. cit., pp. 171-89. 
Isaias waited several months and made his move a week 
after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the U.S., when the 
world’s attention was diverted.49 Over the weekend of 18-
19 September, the crackdown swung into action.50 Eleven 
of the fifteen open letter signatories were imprisoned, in-
cluding such senior figures as Petros Solomon (a former 
military commander who since independence had served, 
successively, as defence, foreign and marine resources 
minister) and Haile Woldensae (ex-foreign minister, re-
cently shunted to trade and industry). Three, including 
Mesfin Hagos, an architect of the EPLF’s victory in 1991, 
were out of the country, so escaped detention; one re-
canted. Those arrested are now either dead or remain in 
jail without trial at an unknown location. In addition, the 
offices of the private press were raided and closed and a 
number of editors and journalists incarcerated indefinitely. 
None of those arrested in September 2001 have ever been 
charged, let alone tried.51 
The public debate which had flourished all too briefly 
was over as quickly as it had begun. The affair was entirely 
predictable for a president who once reportedly declared: 
“When I am challenged, I become more stubborn – more 
and more rigid”.52 In many respects, these events marked 
the completion of a process begun in the mid-1970s, 
whereby the destiny of the revolution – and thus of the 
nation itself – was increasingly in the hands of an overly 
powerful executive that brooked neither dissent nor de-
bate. While the war with Ethiopia brought forward the 
endgame – in effect, the G15 forced Isaias’s hand – the 
hardening of presidential authority had been evident for 
several years, and the G15 had waited too long to move. 
Since 2001, the political system has ossified, and while 
the state cannot strictly be considered totalitarian, since it 
lacks the bureaucratic and technological resources to con-
trol its citizens quite so effectively, the regime has be-
come highly authoritarian. 
 
 
49 A series of party meetings were held during these months in 
which members were mobilised to support the forthcoming 
purge. The G15 were excluded from these meetings. 
50 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes in another capacity, Sep-
tember 2001; also Connell, Conversations, op. cit., pp. 13-14; 
and Gaim Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred (Woodbridge, 
2009), chapter 2. 
51 According to a report by Reporters without Borders, an Eri-
trean former prison guard who recently fled to Ethiopia af-
firmed that six government officials and five journalists ar-
rested in 2001 have died in prison. Among others, he named a 
former vice president, and a former army chief of staff, who 
were sent to isolated camps where conditions were inhuman. In 
2001 there were said to be 35 prisoners in the camps, but fif-
teen died, including five journalists. “Prominent journalist ar-
rested, ex-prison guard reveals fate of other detained journal-
ists”, 12 May 2010. 
52 Quoted in Connell, Against All Odds, op. cit., p. 173. 
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The PFDJ is the sole legal political movement and has 
dominated public and private life. At first glance, there is 
no distinction between party and state. However, the party 
is only one element of an amorphous apparatus centred 
on the president’s office. The PFDJ funded the war effort, 
as the government lacked resources. The party rather than 
government ministries inherited the EPLF legacy and its 
financial and moral capital, but it is only as important as 
the president allows at any given time. Since independ-
ence, and especially since 2001, his favour has alternated 
between the party and the army.53 Creating rivalry be-
tween the two institutions for Isaias’s favour is one of the 
strategies deployed by the Office of the President to 
maintain its importance. 
EPLF/PFDJ members dominate state institutions. From 
the early 1990s, all the main ministries – defence, interior, 
education, health, labour – have been headed by leading 
ex-fighters. Many of the lower rungs in the administrative 
structure have likewise been occupied by tegadelay.54 
Posts were reserved for ex-fighters, and only exception-
ally – notably in the banking sector – were key figures 
brought in who had not seen combat. It was axiomatic 
that there was no job – technical, commercial or adminis-
trative – that an ex-fighter could not do. This created a 
gulf between ex-combatants and everyone else, for whom 
there were relatively few opportunities.55 An independent, 
professional civil service is virtually non-existent, and 
those who work in the lower levels of an increasingly 
stultifying bureaucracy are demoralised, underpaid and 
inadequately trained. Civilians predominate in only a few 
areas, such as teaching. The university was led by a non-
fighter between the mid-1990s and early 2000s and for a 
time was harnessed to the nation-building process, but as 
a key institution that is potentially a seedbed for alterna-
tive views, it has never been trusted.56 
Even before the crackdown, the president frequently ro-
tated ministers.57 Individuals who were out of favour were 
sidelined in largely meaningless posts.58 Today, those 
who criticise or question presidential edicts are “frozen” 
from their posts for lengthy periods, permitted to do little 
but collect their salaries and not much else. Few of the 
early leaders remain in high public office, and the country 
 
 
53 Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, Asmara, 
July-August 2006 and December 2007. 
54 The term is Tigrinya for EPLF fighter. 
55 This is one of the central themes in Kibreab, Eritrea: A 
Dream Deferred, op. cit. 
56 R. J. Reid, “Caught in the Headlights of History: Eritrea, the 
EPLF and the Post-War Nation-State”, Journal of Modern Afri-
can Studies, 43:3 (2005). Many university staff are foreigners. 
57 Connell, Conversations, op. cit., pp. 6-7; Connell, “The 
EPLF/PFDJ Experience”, op. cit., p. 30. 
58 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, Asmara, 2004-2008. 
is mostly run by second- or even third-tier revolutionaries or 
close associates of the president. Moreover, there is often 
duplication of responsibilities, with the president creating 
what are in effect shadow ministries; run by people who 
report to him directly, while the official ministry is left to 
compete for attention.59 Isaias increasingly appoints malle-
able individuals who lack a sense of direction or even dis-
cernible abilities but are eager to do his bidding.60 
B. THE OMNIPOTENT PRESIDENT? 
Inevitably, there is much fascination with the president. 
Whatever system exists revolves around him. Highland 
Eritrean society has traditionally been characterised by 
modesty and communality,61 so it is little wonder that 
Isaias, who directs both foreign and domestic policy (of-
ten even at the micro level) and appoints everyone from 
high court judges, senior military commanders and cabi-
net ministers to middle-ranking officials, mesmerises Eri-
treans and foreigners alike. During the armed struggle, 
the EPLF assiduously eschewed personality cults, and 
rank was rarely displayed ostentatiously. Unnecessary 
swagger and expressions of ego were frowned upon. Yet, 
even when Ramadan Muhammad Nur was EPLF secre-
tary general and Isaias his deputy, few doubted who led 
the movement and increasingly personified the struggle. In 
hindsight, there was already a creeping personality cult.  
Over four decades, Isaias has displayed both ruthless bru-
tality and enormous dexterity in intimidating and outwit-
ting rivals and opponents. Even those bitterly opposed to 
him cannot quite eradicate a lingering (if quietly expressed) 
admiration; it has sometimes been said that he is the 
leader even of the opposition, whose gaze is fixed upon 
him, horrified and awed simultaneously.62 While far from 
a great orator, he delivers his message with a tireless re-
solve from which Eritreans for years have drawn strength 
and inspiration. Only in interviews with foreign journal-
ists does he publicly display flashes of the temper for 
which he is known, batting away provocative questions 
 
 
59 Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, Asmara, 
July-August 2006, December 2007 and August 2008; Connell, 
“The EPLF/PFDJ Experience”, op. cit. 
60 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews, Asmara, 
2004-2008. 
61 Crisis Group analyst interview, Asmara, August 2006. Various 
proverbs in Tigrinya attest to the dangers of “standing out”, and 
placing oneself above others, for example, ‘the tall stalk of sor-
ghum is only for birds and for cutting’, ie, it is marked for death.  
62 Crisis Group analyst interview in another capacity, Asmara, 
August 2006. 
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with an angry contempt that betrays his hostility for the 
world his interlocutors supposedly represent.63 
Austere and often taciturn, Isaias commanded enormous 
affection, even devotion, in the 1990s, except among those 
associated with the ELF or otherwise not reconciled to 
the new EPLF order. He carefully managed the image 
of the dedicated, almost monastic leader in war and in 
peace. Early in the liberation war, he and his closest asso-
ciates often used the tactic of denigrating other leaders 
of the movement by accusing them of losing their way 
and becoming morally and materially corrupt.64 Isaias, 
by contrast, was the great incorruptible leader, who stood 
head and shoulders (often literally) above his lieutenants. 
This is no longer the case. Although some still grudg-
ingly see him as the only figure capable of holding Eri-
trea together, ever more regard him at least sceptically 
and often with outright hostility as the man who has sin-
gle-handedly ruined the country and whose stubbornness, 
once such a valuable asset, has become a serious liabil-
ity.65 Escapees complain of a lost grip on reality. In most 
Eritreans’ eyes, he is no longer the stout-hearted, beloved 
leader of the nation-at-arms, but a mentally unstable 
autocrat with a bad temper and an alcohol problem.66 
Isaias is indeed the fulcrum on which the system rests, 
and the powers of appointment, promotion and demotion 
which have become entrenched in his person define the 
shape and direction of the government.67 As long as he 
retains the army’s loyalty, there are no alternative sources 
of power.68 But two points are worth considering. First, 
no power base is unassailable. Isaias’s strength – his abil-
ity to balance various poles of the Eritrean polity, keeping 
them at arm’s length from one another and controlling 
 
 
63 For example, see “Eritrea’s leader defends curbs”, BBC 
News, 16 April 2003; and “Talk to Al Jazeera: President Isaias 
Afwerki”, Aljazeera.net, 22 February 2010. 
64 This was a tactic frequently employed in China during the 
Cultural Revolution, which Isaias and several others witnessed 
first hand as young trainee guerrillas. See the interviews with 
Petros Solomon and Haile Woldensae in Connell, Conversa-
tions, op. cit. 
65 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes in another capacity, As-
mara, August 2008. In Eritrea, dark jokes are quietly told in 
bars which attest to this fact, although Isaias himself is never 
mentioned; President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is a popular 
surrogate. 
66 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, 2003-2008. See also the burgeoning debate in diaspora 
websites and blogs, such as www.awate.com and www.dehai.org. 
Isaias, a highland Christian by birth, has long had a reputation 
as a hard drinker. See, for example, MichaelaWrong, I Didn’t 
Do It For You: How the World Betrayed a Small African Na-
tion (London, 2005), pp. 375-376. 
67 D. Connell, “Eritrea”, in Countries at the Crossroads 2007, 
Freedom House (Washington, 2007), pp. 3-4. 
68 Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred, op. cit., pp. 375-384. 
them through his office – is also a potential weakness. He 
must continue to manage army, party and government to 
maintain his position. Secondly, while he has been re-
markably successful at out-manoeuvring rivals and im-
posing himself on other parts of the system, this state of 
affairs cannot last for ever. It is necessary to look beyond the 
president to analyse especially the political culture that has 
evolved over a half-century and of which he is a product. 
C. THE MILITARY 
Eritrea is a highly militarised society shaped by war, run 
by warriors and in which citizenship has come to be 
equated with indefinite national service – associated not 
with rights but with obligations.69 The ethos of the armed 
struggle permeates all aspects of public life, and the coun-
try has proved unable, as yet, to escape its violent past. 
Immediately after independence, the EPLF created a sys-
tem of national service, the core component of which was 
military, centred on the training camp at Sawa, where it 
sought to inculcate the next generation with the culture 
and spirit of the liberation struggle.70 Sawa was conceived 
as the foundation stone of the nation-building process.71 
Initially, it was a potentially constructive arrangement: 
all men and women between the ages of eighteen and 50 
were to undergo six months of military training, followed 
by twelve months either of active duty deployment or 
developmental work. 
Several such rounds were completed between 1993 and 
1998. However, the war with Ethiopia brought a funda-
mental change, as the national service commitment be-
came, in effect, indefinite. Young Eritreans were swiftly 
absorbed into a military machine with little prospect of 
eventual demobilisation or even appropriate levels of 
leave. In 2002, this was formalised by the creation of the 
Warsai Yikalo72 development campaign, which amounted 
to the institutionalisation of the liberation struggle on a 
massive scale.73 Today hundreds of thousands are trapped 
in the system, since despite commitments made after the 
2000 ceasefire, the demobilisation program is largely 
suspended.74 The small groups which have been released 
 
 
69 “Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscrip-
tion in Eritrea”, Human Rights Watch, April 2009. 
70 Reid, “Caught in the Headlights”, op. cit. 
71 Crisis Group analyst interview in another capacity, Asmara, 
August 2006. 
72 The phrase literally means “those who follow the powerful”: 
the warsai are the young generation who have come of age 
since independence, while the yikalo, “the all-powerful”, are 
EPLF fighters. 
73 Gaim Kibreab, “Forced Labour in Eritrea”, Journal of Mod-
ern African Studies, 47:1 (2009). 
74 “Service for Life”, op. cit. Salaries in the national service are 
extremely low. Many are drafted back into the national service 
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from time to time are often composed of those who are 
chronically ill, and their numbers are swiftly replaced by 
new recruits caught in periodic round-ups.75 
The government’s position is that national service is nec-
essary for nation-building, to imbue younger people with 
a sense of loyalty, discipline and patriotism and to break 
down regional, ethnic and religious barriers. It defends 
the prominent role of the military, arguing that Eritrea is 
surrounded by enemies, so cannot afford to let down its 
guard.76 According to the familiar refrain, now is not the 
time for demobilisation and a weakening of its guard. 
However, the growing domestic crisis results in part from 
the dogged pursuit of national service to the virtual exclu-
sion of all else. Sawa receives a level of investment wholly 
absent from higher education. Indeed, while Sawa was 
being expanded, the University of Asmara was run into 
the ground.  
The indefinite nature of the Warsai Yikalo campaign has 
crushed morale, especially among the young. Sawa and 
everything it represents have come to be loathed by suc-
cessive generations of school-leavers, for whom there are 
no opportunities for advancement, only the prospect of 
indefinite assignment to military duty. The resulting mili-
tarisation, moreover, reflects and in turn reinforces the 
frequently disastrous conviction that all the nation’s prob-
lems have a military solution. 
The Eritrean Defence Forces (EDF) are descended di-
rectly from the Eritrean People’s Liberation Army, which 
was once widely admired as one of the most effective 
fighting organisations in the world. That reputation began 
to erode in May-June 2000, when the EDF was forced to 
abandon a third of the country in the face of the Ethiopian 
offensive. This was also politically catastrophic, as the 
military was considered one of the nation’s greatest 
strengths. The country is divided into five theatres of op-
eration, headed by generals, all under the direct command 
of the president. The long-serving defence minister, Sebhat 
Ephrem, is frequently ignored (as he was during the 1998-
 
 
several times, for example after a prison sentence, as a punish-
ment for attempting to flee, doing “illegal business” or because 
they have specific needed skills or education. Crisis Group 
email correspondence with diplomat formerly based in Asmara, 
21 August 2010. 
75 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes in another capacity, various 
locations in Eritrea, 1999-2008. People vanish into hiding for 
days, sometimes even weeks, at a time. The analyst has known 
individuals who basically lived “underground” for months at a 
stretch trying to avoid recruitment round-ups. 
76 Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, Asmara, 
July 2006, December 2007 and August 2008. 
2000 war). The separate national security service is also 
ultimately under Isaias’s direct control.77 
As in the political sphere, military decision-making is 
impossibly centralised. The generals – the most powerful 
figures after Isaias – are the de facto governors of the re-
gions.78 There are frequently bitter rivalries between 
them, and their commands suffer from deteriorating mo-
rale and large-scale desertion. Along some stretches of 
the border, forces reportedly often operate at well under 
half-strength.79 The army is haemorrhaging capacity, as 
hundreds of youths attempt to escape to Sudan, Ethiopia 
or, less commonly, Djibouti every month,80 while ten-
sions between the older tegadelay and the younger warsai 
generations threaten to destroy EDF cohesion.81 
Worse still, corruption and misuse of resources is rife in 
the EDF. Isaias has reportedly had to detain and repri-
mand senior officers for allowing this, although he is re-
luctant to do so publicly. It is widely suspected that some 
senior officers themselves are involved in illicit activities. 
Would-be deserters can pay agents – some of whom are 
officers – to facilitate their escape across the border; fees 
vary, but up to $10,000 can ensure that at least part of the 
trip is in a land cruiser, while smaller sums may cause an 
officer to turn his back at the decisive moment.82 Cap-
tured deserters are brutally treated in special military 
holding centres, where torture and extrajudicial deaths are 
common.83 Increasingly scarce building materials, food-
stuffs, soft drinks and alcohol are hoarded and smuggled 
 
 
77 Connell, “Eritrea”, op. cit., p. 17. 
78 Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, Asmara, 
July-August 2006 and December 2007. 
79 Crisis Group analyst interview in another capacity, Asmara, 
August 2008. 
80 There are currently some 209,000 Eritrean refugees. In 2009, 
there were 43,300 new asylum claims from Eritrea. “Global 
Trends 2009”, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
Division of Program Support and Management, 15 June 2010, 
pp. 8, 18. 
81 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, Asmara, 2006-2008. When people flee and the gov-
ernment finds out (regular door-to-door checks are conducted 
of family members), the family has to pay a large fine or its 
members must serve a prison sentence. Crisis Group email 
correspondence with diplomat formerly based in Asmara, 21 
August 2010. 
82 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, Asmara, since 2004. Deserters are said always to be 
told, however, to leave their weapons. 
83 There is extensive testimony in K. Tronvoll, The Lasting Strug-
gle for Freedom in Eritrea: Human Rights and Political Devel-
opment, 1991-2009 (Oslo, 2009), pp. 76-88; also in “Service 
for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eri-
trea”, Human Rights Watch, 16 April 2009; and Eritrea entries 
in Amnesty International’s annual reports at http://thereport. 
amnesty.org/. 
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by senior officers. Commanders frequently use recruits 
for personal projects, such as constructing homes, and as 
attendants.84 In effect, the army is currently organised un-
officially into economic and political fiefdoms under com-
manders who pursue their own interests, while military 
capacities deteriorate rapidly. 
Yet, while they may no longer always see eye to eye after 
the inconclusive result of the war with Ethiopia that gen-
erals tend to blame on the president’s mismanagement, 
Isaias owes his position to a large extent to the loyalty of 
the core leadership of the military, including the national 
security forces. It is the guardian of whatever internal sta-
bility there is and would be the arbiter of the transition 
should anything happen to him in the near term. But the 
army’s growing weakness – materially, in terms of its 
morale and manpower and in its standing in the country 
as a whole85 – means that in the medium term it may no 
longer be in a position either to protect the president or to 
manage political change. 
D. THE PENAL STATE 
Eritrea can aptly be described as a prison state, without 
rule of law or independent judiciary and where the legal 
process is routinely ignored, and internal security is ever 
more oppressive and ubiquitous.86 The government has 
long demonstrated a cavalier attitude toward the law, in-
cluding the safeguards critical to protection of civil soci-
ety.87 From the early 1990s, the police were deliberately 
given excessive power, with no checks or monitors to 
curb them. State security targets suspect groups with rela-
tive impunity. One is Jehovah’s Witnesses, whose mem-
bers refused to acknowledge the earthly kingdom being 
created by the EPLF, so did not participate in the 1993 
referendum and refuse national service. To the EPLF, this 
renders them non-citizens and a legitimate target. The le-
gal system functions primarily to bring dissenters to heel, 
without a formal legal code.88 Judges are not independent 
and are closely monitored. Moreover, the legal profession, 
like the enfeebled civil service, suffers from a chronic lack 
of skills and training.89 
For a brief period, some independent-minded judges at-
tempted to assert themselves. Most famously, in July 
2001 the chief justice, Teame Beyene, publicly criticised 
 
 
84 Kibreab, “Forced Labour”, op. cit. 
85 A common joke in recent years has been that “EDF” actually 
stands for Eat, Drink, F***. 
86 Tronvoll, Lasting Struggle for Freedom, op. cit., chapters 5 
and 6; Connell, “Eritrea”, op. cit., pp. 9-15. 
87 Gebremedhin, Challenges of a Society, op. cit. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Tronvoll, Lasting Struggle for Freedom, op. cit., chapters 2 
and 3; Connell, “Eritrea”, op. cit., p. 6. 
the president’s interference in civil courts and establish-
ment of the Special Court. He was promptly dismissed.90 
The Special Court was established in 1996 by Isaias. Its 
original purpose was purportedly to arrest the decline in 
moral standards among key public figures.91 It has come 
to be used to deal with corruption, capital offences and 
political cases. Its judges are EPLF officials and army 
commanders appointed personally by the president and 
accountable solely to him. Its sessions are usually held in 
secret. 
Intolerance of opposition appears to be worsening. Be-
tween 2001 and 2010 there have been tens of thousands 
of arrests of political prisoners and prisoners of con-
science, most of whom have yet to be brought to trial.92 In 
detention, they endure horrendous conditions and are rou-
tinely tortured.93 Extrajudicial killing is commonplace.94 
This has been documented in detail through research by 
both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, 
particularly among Eritrean refugees.95 
The government has become extremely suspicious of the 
outside world and paranoid about any Eritrean associated 
with “external influences” and not fully committed to the 
“national cause”. Enemies of the state and “non-citizens” 
are seen to come in many guises. In addition to that of 
the Jehovah’s Witnesses, the persecution of Pentecostal 
Christians has escalated dramatically in recent years.96 
Internal security forces monitor, harass and routinely de-
tain those identified as practising “illegal” faiths. The 
state recognises as legal faiths only the Lutheran Church, 
Orthodox Christianity, Roman Catholicism and Islam. All 
others are regarded as dangerous, unpatriotic and “for-
eign”. Muslims belonging to new, unrecognised groups 
are likewise targeted, as are followers of the Bahai faith. 
Others who are jailed include, failed asylum seekers, busi-
nessmen and merchants suspected of hoarding goods or 
 
 
90 Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred, op. cit., pp. 32, 61. 
91 Tronvoll, Lasting Struggle for Freedom, op. cit., pp. 38-45. 
92 “Service for Life”, op. cit., pp. 24-29. Diaspora websites con-
tain detailed accounts of arrested and “disappeared” individu-
als. See, for example, www.awate.com, www.delina.org and 
www.ehrea.org. 
93 Tronvoll, Lasting Struggle for Freedom, op. cit., chapter 5; 
diaspora websites. 
94 Ibid.; “Service for Life”, op. cit., pp. 38-41. 
95 See “Service for Life”, Human Rights Watch, op. cit.; and 
Eritrea entries in Amnesty International’s annual reports, op. cit.  
96 Pentecostal denominations are historically less than 2 per cent 
of the population, but young Eritreans have increasingly been 
drawn to their message, and thousands of overseas asylum 
seekers are – or claim to be – Pentecostal. Some 3,000 Chris-
tians from non-state sanctioned religions were in detention in 
2009. Eritrea entry in “Amnesty International Report 2010”, 
op. cit., p. 137. 
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otherwise engaging in black market activities, journalists 
who have been critical or are suspected of being potential 
critics and a range of political dissidents, real or imagined, 
including those who in 2000-2002 expressed misgivings 
about the government. Draft evaders and deserters have 
swollen jails more than any other single category. There 
is deep and widespread fear of the security forces, and 
contrary political thoughts are rarely, if ever, voiced in 
public, and then only in hushed tones.97 
E. OPPOSING THE STATE 
Political debate and pluralism have rarely flourished in 
Eritrea: briefly in the late 1940s; as part of the under-
ground nationalist movement in the late 1960s and early 
1970s; and then even more briefly in 2000-2001.98 The 
EPLF is the product of a splinter opposition movement to 
the then-dominant ELF. The civil war between the ELF 
and EPLF confirmed in the minds of its leadership that 
there was no room for debate and dissent in the vortex of 
violent competing nationalisms and in the face of the pow-
erful Ethiopian enemy. Therefore, the EPLF permitted no 
other liberation front to operate within the country, just as 
it accepted no disunity within its own ranks. Once driven 
into Sudan in 1981 and then scattered into European and 
North American exile, however, the ELF spawned a range 
of movements that opposed the EPLF from abroad. While 
some fighters and factions rejoined the EPLF in the late 
1980s, the rest remained firmly outside the political fold. 
There consequently has always been a broad opposition 
outside the country,99 ranging from branches of the ELF; 
to ethnocentric “liberation” organisations (notably Kunama 
and Afar); to new parties fronted by former EPLF leaders 
and other dissidents in exile. These remain divided. Some 
advocate constitutional, negotiated transition and thus a 
degree of engagement with the EPLF; others call for re-
newal of armed struggle. There are also starkly different 
perceptions of the regime, whether as a Tigrinya dictator-
ship or a manifestation of Christian hegemony. Thus, 
there are sometimes sharp disagreements between Ti-
grinya highlanders in exile – especially those associated 
with the armed struggle – and Muslims – especially those 
from or purporting to represent the lowlands.100 There are 
likewise disagreements over leadership and structure. 
 
 
97 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, 2003-2008. 
98 Gebre-Medhin, Peasants and Nationalism, op. cit.; Connell, 
Conversations, op. cit. 
99 Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred, op. cit., pp. 316-23. 
100 In recent years, the sprawling Eritrean National Alliance 
coalition founded in October 2002 has morphed into the Eri-
trean Democratic Alliance (established in March 2005), with 
No legal opposition party or broad opposition movement 
exists – yet – in the country.101 Hostility to the govern-
ment is manifest in silent, fearful, brooding disengage-
ment from the state and tacit withdrawal of support from 
the tegadelay generation. Yet, despite the deep disillu-
sionment and low morale, overseas opposition parties are 
regarded somewhat sceptically. Ordinary citizens are not 
yet persuaded that any of them would significantly im-
prove their lot. Many believe the leaders of some of these 
movements are cut from much the same cloth as the 
president and are at the least unsure of their democratic 
credentials.102 This is true with respect to such key oppo-
sition leaders as Mesfin Hagos, one of the G15, and 
Heruy Tedla Bairu, formerly a key ELF leader. The cause 
of some opposition groups is not helped by the fact that 
they regularly congregate in Addis Ababa and have met 
with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. Few Eri-
treans would welcome an Ethiopian-backed movement.103 
The only opposition movement of any significance which 
operates inside Eritrea, at least part of the time, is Eritrean 
Islamic Jihad (EIJ), an armed, radical Islamic front. 
Founded in the early 1980s, it enjoyed the support of both 
the Sudanese government and Osama bin Laden in the 
1990s.104 It continues to operate covertly at a relatively low 
level in the western lowlands and northern mountains. 
Until the recent thaw in relations with Sudan, Asmara 
regularly accused Khartoum of providing support and 
bases to enable it to cross the remote border with ease. 
Despite the low-level of its activities, EIJ has potential to tap 
into the alienation of young Muslims, who are increasingly 
aggrieved at state interference in Muslim institutions, 
land alienation, the economic domination of highlanders 
(especially in the western lowlands), the state’s refusal to 
recognise Arabic as an official language, the lack of Mus-
lim representation in the upper echelons of the political 
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101 The government considers the Pentecostal churches an op-
position movement. 
102 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes in another capacity, As-
mara, since 2004. 
103 Eritrea claims Ethiopia has stepped up efforts to destabilise 
it by hosting a meeting of opposition groups in Addis and offer-
ing to coordinate their activities and give military and logistical 
support. Crisis Group interview, Eritrean permanent representa-
tive to the UN, New York, 16 August 2010. 
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and military leadership and the recruitment of Muslim 
women into the army.105 
The government is dismissive of talk of elections and 
democratic change.106 The refrain remains “this is not the 
right time”. Isaias Afwerki and his followers believe that 
nobody in the exiled opposition understands the country’s 
perils and that such adversaries are at best naive and fool-
ish, at worst, traitors. National security must always come 
first, they say, whatever the cost – but that cost is mounting. 
 
 
105 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, various locations in Eritrea, since 2001; Kibreab, Eri-
trea: A Dream Deferred, op. cit. 
106 Crisis Group analyst interview in another capacity, Asmara, 
August 2006. 
IV. SOCIETY AND ECONOMY  
UNDER SIEGE 
A. THE “WAR” ECONOMY 
Rarely, has Eritrea enjoyed economic security. While 
there were periods of growth in particular sectors – for 
example, under the Italians light manufacturing and in-
frastructure expanded in the 1920s and 1930s – these 
have always been at a low level.107 It has also been con-
sistently vulnerable to environmental calamity, especially 
drought and hunger since the late nineteenth century.108 
Periods of depression and unemployment in the towns 
and poor harvests in the countryside have spurred politi-
cal action and facilitated the expansion of political con-
sciousness – notably in the 1940s and 1950s, and again in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The long liberation war, as well as 
material neglect under Ethiopia from the 1950s to the 
1980s, destroyed the economy, so that on independence, 
the government faced an enormous task of reconstruction. 
For several years in the 1990s, it seemed a combination 
of good harvests and the social and political capital en-
joyed by the EPLF would enable the government to lay the 
foundations for recovery. The doctrine of self-reliance, 
developed during the armed struggle, was pursued with 
vigour and won plaudits from the donor community. The 
government made a great deal of its human capital in the 
absence of financial capital, and aimed at a long-haul, 
gradual rebuilding program.109 However, whatever foun-
dations were laid were destroyed by the war, which was 
far more devastating for Eritrea than for Ethiopia. Money 
needed for infrastructure and basic social services was 
poured into the purchase of war material, while the huge 
army strained the already fragile industrial and agricul-
tural sectors. At one point more than 10 per cent of the 
population was mobilised.110 
 
 
107 For historical overviews, see Iyob, Eritrean Struggle; Gebre-
Medhin, Peasants and Nationalism; Bereketeab, Eritrea; and 
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A high level of mobilisation has been maintained, with 
crippling economic effects. Hundreds of thousands of the 
most productive citizens – men and women between their 
late teens and 40s – are trapped in national service, un-
able to contribute significantly to economic growth. In the 
meantime, hundreds of young people illegally flee every 
month, a brain- and skill-drain that is a socio-economic 
catastrophe.111 The government appears not to appreciate 
the full implications of this, or if it does, appears not to 
know what to do about it. 
The upshot is that the economy has been in suspended 
animation for several years.112 GDP growth has been de-
clining steadily;113 foreign currency reserves are close to 
depleted; and the banking sector is crippled. One of the 
chief problems is that Ethiopia constituted about two 
thirds of Eritrea’s export market; the closure of that mar-
ket has been devastating, and factories and labour have 
been idle as a result. Sudan now accounts for the vast 
bulk of Eritrea’s exports; imports – mostly machinery and 
transport equipment, food and live animals and manufac-
tured goods – come from the UAE and Saudi Arabia, 
with smaller amounts from Italy and other European Un-
ion (EU) countries.114 There is scarcely an internal mar-
ket, as ordinary Eritreans increasingly struggle merely to 
survive. National service conscripts earn less than $20 
monthly in real terms.  
National service puts large pools of labour at the state’s 
disposal for commercial agricultural projects and the 
building of roads and dams; however, these are exercises 
in state control rather than significant contributions to 
economic development – many such projects are largely 
irrelevant, such as roads which carry little commercial 
traffic. National service labour is also frequently idle and 
unproductive. The transfer of youthful labour from rural 
areas to the army has crippled agricultural production.115 
 
 
2003), pp. 208-212; A. Gat, War in Human Civilisation (Ox-
ford, 2006), pp. 526-527.  
111 There may eventually be a benefit if these Eritreans eventually 
return, better educated, with experience and transferrable skills. 
112 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, various locations in Eritrea, since 2000. 
113 According to the World Bank, GDP grew on an annual aver-
age by 0.4 per cent from 1998-2008, and per capita GDP de-
clined by 3.3 per cent during the same period. This is in sharp 
contrast to 9.2 per cent annual GDP growth and 8 per cent per 
capita GDP growth during the previous ten years. “Eritrea at a 
glance”, World Bank, 12 September 2009. 
114 “Country Report: Eritrea”, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 
August 2006. 
115 A. Poole, “The Youth has Gone from our Soil: Place and 
Politics in Refugee Settlement and Agrarian Development”, in 
D. O’Kane and Tricia Redeker Hepner (eds.), Biopolitics, Mili-
tarism and Development: Eritrea in the Twenty-First Century 
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There is little or no domestic investment in agriculture, 
industry or services. Poverty is extensive and visible, even 
in Asmara. 
The result is that millions rely on their kin overseas. In-
creasingly, foreign currency is sent outside official chan-
nels to avoid unrealistic exchange rates. The currency black 
market is huge, though risky.116 The one major bright spot 
is the potential for mineral extraction, particularly gold. 
Large-scale gold production, expected to begin in 2010, 
would improve the state’s foreign currency position.117 
Many companies are already involved in exploration 
and/or mining, with others negotiating for permission. 
The government would likely use the windfall it antici-
pates mainly for armaments, which could, therefore, increase 
the chance of a new conflict. Plans to operate free trade 
zones at the ports of Massawa and Assab118 remain to be 
implemented. 
It is difficult to obtain hard economic and financial data, 
because there are no public records or published national 
budget. Like the political system, the economic sector is 
largely inscrutable; there is little auditing and certainly 
none by external actors.119 Several other factors are rele-
vant to an assessment of the economic crisis. The first, 
which has wider social implications, relates to land. The 
1994 proclamation asserting that the state owns all land 
has created anxiety and bitterness, not least because the 
government is willing to ignore local concerns in order to 
pursue its programs.120 It believes customary tenure and 
usage is inefficient and an obstacle to progress, though 
there is no indication yet that its commercial development 
policy will succeed. Additionally, it has tried to settle 
nomadic pastoralists – whose traditional mobility it dis-
trusts because it makes them difficult to control – in 
more sedentary communities. This has created resentment, 
especially in the western lowlands, and may well cause 
future turbulence.121 
Secondly, the PFDJ and the state control absolutely the 
private sector, co-owning the main financial and com-
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gional mining surge”, www.africagoodnews.com, 1 February 2010. 
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119 One of the few recent attempts at statistical analysis is The 
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time, most recently in December 2009. 
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mercial institutions and running most industrial and agri-
cultural enterprises and supporting services. The party has 
an enormous portfolio of commercial and industrial con-
cerns and is the sole owner of, or senior partner in, a wide 
range of trade, financial services, transport, construction 
and other industrial enterprises.122 The private sector, 
such as it is, is extremely fragile. Would-be investors, 
particularly from the diaspora, have been discouraged by 
state interference, as well as the precarious economic and 
political environment. Foreign businesses frequently find 
themselves under pressure to include the PFDJ as a part-
ner, particularly in the mining sector. Failure to do so means 
withdrawal of cooperation, in effect rendering business 
impossible. Small firms come under close scrutiny from 
the state, with recently updated bureaucratic procedures 
forming an enormous obstacle.123 
Thirdly, the doctrine of self-reliance increasingly looks 
like folly. While much was made of this during the libera-
tion struggle and the 1990s, when several major NGOs 
were asked to leave after they refused to hand over funds 
for the sole use of the state, Eritrea is now in increasingly 
desperate need of assistance. Though national television 
often claims the country is exempt from the drought af-
fecting the rest of the region,124 a series of bad harvests has 
left many people in need of food aid. Exact numbers are 
difficult to establish, because aid agencies are not permitted 
to operate in the worst affected areas of the countryside. 
But it is clear that the government regards food aid as tan-
tamount to an infringement of sovereignty. In December 
2009, for example, it announced that it was confiscating 
food aid, declaring that such outside assistance made 
people ‘lazy’.125 It appears to be withholding the aid as a 
way of punishing or controlling the population; if this 
persists, there will soon be a humanitarian crisis. 
B. SOCIETY UNDER STRAIN 
The social fabric is now under a great deal of strain. 
While the government has long believed that it can rely 
on a fundamental patriotism and that Eritreans can accept 
prolonged hardship, millions are increasingly disengaging 
from the state and even their own communities – and fo-
cus only on immediate family, preoccupied with seeking 
ways to survive and ultimately escape. Community life is 
suffering, especially as fear of informants grows: it is widely 
held that such low-paid individuals are everywhere and 
that a careless word can lead to arrest and disappearance. 
 
 
122 Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred, op. cit., chapters 5 and 6. 
123 The national service requirement presents a huge problem 
for small businesses to find and retain skilled labour. 
124 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes in another capacity, As-
mara, especially 2006-2008. 
125 “Eritrea’s controversial push to feed itself”, BBC News, 24 
December 2009. 
Taxi drivers are often recruited, while other informants 
patrol bars and cafes; but it is believed that such spies can 
be anyone, including friends and even family.126 
Crime remains remarkably low, considering the economic 
desperation, although it is higher than a decade ago. Among 
young people, especially, there is evidence of severe 
trauma and depression, with psychological disorders com-
monplace and bleak views of the future routinely ex-
pressed.127 An entire generation – those born in the 1980s 
and 1990s – feels that its future has been taken away. No 
ordinary citizen between the ages of eighteen and 50 can 
leave the country legally, other than in the most excep-
tional circumstances or through official connections.128 
Thousands of young people dream of escaping to Europe 
or North America, for example to pursue education. That 
many who cross the borders languish in refugee camps or 
live in squalid conditions in European and North Ameri-
can cities while pursuing asylum applications does not 
seem to have dampened the ambitions of those left be-
hind. The refrain is that “there is no life in Eritrea”, and 
therefore any alternative is preferable.129 
While there is no organised opposition inside Eritrea, 
there is a silent hostility to and a lack of trust in the gov-
ernment.130 A great gulf has opened between the state and 
its citizens, and there is some evidence that the govern-
ment has at times recognised this, for example organising 
public seminars in 2005 at which invitees were allowed 
to air grievances.131 But this has not translated into any 
serious attempt to re-engage, for the political elite essen-
tially believes that the people will ultimately follow orders 
and not move against it, at least not as long as the per-
ceived threat from Ethiopia remains. This may hold true 
in the short term, but it is a dangerous calculation for the 
medium to long term. 
One of the main causes of this crisis is a disastrous terti-
ary education policy. In recent years, the government has 
effectively closed the University of Asmara and replaced 
it with colleges outside the capital that are run in the fash-
ion of military camps.132 While certain principles of this 
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new policy were sound – the decentralisation of higher 
education and the location of particular disciplines in 
relevant parts of the country (marine biology in Massawa, 
on the coast, for example) – it seems increasingly clear 
that the policy is driven by contempt for education (and 
certainly critical thinking) and an attempt to control school- 
leavers. The party has also become involved in political 
education, to expand the ranks of its cadres. The PFDJ-
run “cadre school” in Nafka is one of the institutions that 
has largely replaced conventional higher education.133 
Independent civil society does not exist in any meaning-
ful way. The party dominates what passes for the non-
governmental sector.134 It runs national unions for youths 
and students, women and workers, much as during the 
armed struggle branches of the EPLF were responsible 
for socio-economic entities that were to participate in the 
“social revolution”. No independent civil society groups, 
trade unions or NGOs are permitted; strikes are not al-
lowed under any circumstances; and advocacy or lobby 
groups cannot be organised outside PFDJ structures. 
Leaders of the party unions are carefully vetted. Religious 
organisations, both Christian and Muslim, are closely 
monitored. Their leaders are cowed and take no public 
stance on policy or any other social issue. The last time a 
senior non-government figure was publicly outspoken 
was in 2005, when the deeply revered Patriarch of the 
Eritrean Orthodox Church criticised state interference in 
the church’s affairs. He was stripped of his authority and 
has been under house arrest ever since.135 
Eritrea is regarded as one of the worst offenders in terms 
of press freedom.136 No independent media has been per-
mitted since 2001. Already in the early 1990s, the gov-
ernment demonstrated it was at best ambivalent about a 
free media; journalists were a target from the outset. One 
was Ruth Simon, an Agence France-Presse local who was 
detained in 1997 for reporting a “private” speech by 
Isaias.137 A private press did flourish briefly in the late 
1990s, largely buoyed by its ability to report on the 
war.138 But as soon as it began to criticise the govern-
ment in 2000-2001, its days were numbered. Its outlets 
have been closed since September 2001. Many journalists 
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136 For example, see “World Report: Eritrea”, Reporters without 
Borders, April 2009; “Service for Life”, op. cit., pp. 56-58. 
137 Mengisteab and Yohannes, Anatomy, op. cit., pp. 87-88. She 
was also a former EPLF fighter. 
138 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, Asmara, 1999-2000. 
languish in prison, and several have almost certainly died 
in detention.139 
Today, only state-run media operate, including the news-
papers Hadas Eritrea (Tigrinya); Eritrea al-Hadisa (Ara-
bic); the Eritrea Profile (English); the television channel 
EriTV; a radio station (Dimtsi Hafash, “voice of the 
masses”); and the website Shaebia.org. Other publications 
and news services are controlled by the government. All 
produce carefully-vetted material and militaristic propa-
ganda. Journalists at the information ministry – often 
largely untrained national service personnel – are closely 
monitored, not least because they occasionally flee the 
country.140 The ministry is the voice of the state, and its 
head, Ali Abdu, is sometimes seen as being groomed as a 
possible successor to Isaias.141 There are few foreign jour-
nalists. Those who make it through the rigorous accredita-
tion process find their movements highly restricted; when 
they become too critical, they are “frozen” or expelled.142 
Internet and email are closely monitored, though Eritreans 
frequently access opposition websites.143 
The government’s attitude toward the media highlights 
two key and interrelated anxieties. The first is paranoia 
about nefarious external influences. Isaias is on record as 
believing that the private media were tools of the CIA, 
which planted stories to undermine the government.144 
Secondly, there is obsession with unity and stability at the 
expense of basic freedoms. The 1996 Press Law was sup-
posed to guarantee a free media, but it also made clear 
that no outlet should produce material which promoted 
dissension and division or might “disturb the peace”. The 
government can intervene at any time to prevent the dis-
semination of “undesirable” material. The deep concern 
for preservation of unity reflects the leadership’s worry 
about the ultimate trustworthiness of its citizens and the 
country’s very viability. 
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C. THE MULTI-FAITH AND MULTI-ETHNIC 
NATION 
Eritrea contains enormous physical, cultural and ethnic 
diversity, from the highland plateau (known as the ke-
bessa) in the centre to the hot coastal plains and the 
Danakil depression stretching to the south, to the western 
lowlands abutting Sudan (the metahit).145 Within those 
regions are the distinctive but interconnected economic, 
cultural and linguistic groupings which comprise the nine 
official ethnicities. There is also the divide between Chris-
tians and Muslims, whose numbers are currently fairly 
equally balanced. Considering such diversity, and the 
presence of so many potential fault lines, a history of con-
flict is unsurprising. It has included clashes over farmland 
and access to vital trade routes, as well as between sea-
sonally migrating herdsmen and settled agriculturists. 
There have been sporadic tensions between the dominant 
group of the highlands, the Tigrinya – a Semitic culture 
with close links to the Tigrinya and the Amhara of Ethio-
pia – and a range of smaller adjacent groups. Yet, the 
main roots of historical volatility and instability have long 
been connected with violence and political upheaval in 
northern Ethiopia and eastern Sudan. 
Despite occasional conflict and the marked diversity, Eri-
trea has by and large avoided the kind of serious inter-
ethnic and religious strife associated with the region.146 
Economic lifestyles, cultures, faiths and ethnicities have 
mostly coexisted peacefully. Church and mosque have 
stood side by side, occasional clashes notwithstanding. 
There are sometimes perceptions that the Tigrinya domi-
nate politics, but this has rarely translated into direct po-
litical action. They are the largest single ethnic and cultural 
grouping, and through much of the country’s history this 
has been accepted, on the whole, by others. Within the 
highlands themselves, there have been at times tense ri-
valries between the historical provinces of Hamasien, 
Akele Guzai and Serae, but this has not led to significant 
political confrontation, at least since the late nineteenth 
century.147 Contrary to what might be expected, Eritrea has 
thus remained at relative peace with itself to a remarkable 
extent. Some have attributed this to historically-rooted 
“social capital” – intra- and inter-community cooperation 
– which has usually kept conflicts local and resolvable by 
networks of understanding and diplomacy.148 
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This said, there are worrying signs that enormous strain 
has been placed on this culture of local conflict resolution 
and tolerance and that the fault lines are potentially ex-
tremely volatile. In spite of relatively harmonious socio-
economic relations at the micro level, Eritrea has long been 
politically fractured at the macro level. The 1940s and 
1950s demonstrated the fragmented nature of its politics, 
with groups holding markedly divergent views about the 
nature and the future of the territory. This was evident 
again in the 1970s, with the ELF-EPLF civil war. Even if, 
as is often argued, that conflict was essentially fought by 
leadership elites and their guerrilla forces rather than the 
wider population, it demonstrated a potential for massive 
political rupture that has haunted the polity ever since. 
Moreover, economic desperation could create motives for 
wider patterns of violence. 
The government’s commitment to secularism is to be ap-
plauded, but any gains in social equality are now under 
threat as it aggressively persecutes certain faiths, most 
notably the Pentecostal churches but also mainstream Is-
lam and Orthodox Christianity. Muslims are increasingly 
alienated from the state, and Islamic identities are becom-
ing more entrenched. The government’s contemptuous 
attitudes toward certain Christian denominations are radi-
calising the young in particular. Practising Muslims and 
Christians alike are roundly abused in the army.149 
Land policy also has potential to increase conflict within 
and between communities, as swathes of territory in the 
western lowlands are set aside for Tigrinya highlanders. 
The perception among some groups – notably agro-
pastoralist communities in the west and north – of the Ti-
grinya as overbearing land-grabbers will continue to grow as 
long as a distant highland government imposes its develop-
mental agenda. Settled farming is systemically privileged 
above pastoralism, raising tensions between the Tigrinya 
and the Kunama, Beni Amer and Tigre groups of the west 
and north.150 
The state is clearly terrified of national disunity but has 
removed all legitimate channels of protest, thus driving 
resistance abroad and underground, where it will likely 
become more radicalised. The impact of militarised au-
thoritarianism has been devastating on society. Enormous 
social-economic pressures are now at work, and long-
dormant cultural, religious and ethnic fissures may well 
be prised open, the unintended outcome of the political 
program of enforced unity. 
 
 
149 This is borne out by research among refugees undertaken by 
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for Life”, Human Rights Watch, op. cit., and Eritrea entries in 
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D. ERITREA OVERSEAS: THE ROLE  
OF THE DIASPORA 
The large diaspora has been hugely significant in the 
making of modern Eritrea.151 The first wave fled overseas 
in the 1970s and 1980s, when the liberation war was at its 
height, and continued the struggle in Europe, North Amer-
ica and Australia by organising events, debating policy 
and collecting critical funds.152 Since then, it has swollen 
in size, supplemented by growing numbers of refugees 
and asylum-seekers fleeing from the very movement the 
previous generation had sacrificed to support. Large com-
munities are now in Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, the 
UK, Scandinavia, Canada and the U.S. – the latter nota-
bly in the Washington DC area and California.153 There 
are also swelling pockets of “transit” Eritreans in Kenya, 
Uganda and Sudan, who have not yet quite made it out of 
the region; South Africa is an important transit stage. This 
new influx has heightened tensions within the diaspora 
community by highlighting differing degrees of support 
for or antipathy toward the government. The arrival of so 
many new members has also placed severe financial strains 
on families who already often have responsibility for kin 
inside the country. 
Many members of the older diaspora were educated in the 
West and had skills and professions to offer an independent 
Eritrea that, however, proved reluctant to use them, sus-
picious as it was of anyone who had not participated di-
rectly in the struggle. In the early 1990s, many came back 
enthusiastically to offer their services but encountered 
either an institutional cold shoulder or a bureaucracy that 
kept them at arm’s length,154 and many soon returned to 
Europe or North America. Wealthier diaspora members 
who wished to invest and represented a major opportunity 
for socio-economic development experienced much the 
same. They, too, were increasingly disappointed to find 
that tight controls were being placed on the embryonic 
private sector and that the government was deeply suspi-
cious of the diaspora entrepreneur.155 As the ruling party 
showed its intention to dominate the private sector, many 
would-be investors withdrew and have not returned. 
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152 The best account is Tricia Redeker Hepner, Soldiers, Mar-
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Diaspora (Philadelphia, 2009). 
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trea has been ranked 175th out of 183 economies in the ease of 
doing business. “Doing Business 2010”, World Bank and Inter-
national Finance Corporation, www.doingbusiness.org, 2009. 
155 Kibreab, Eritrea: A Dream Deferred, op. cit., chapters 5 and 6. 
Yet, the diaspora’s financial contributions have always 
been critical. In the 1970s and 1980s, the money it raised 
– and the wider awareness especially the activities of the 
Eritrean Relief Association – were vital in sustaining the 
armed struggle. Remittances were critical during the 1998-
2000 war and have become ever more important. In order 
to maintain their full rights as citizens – particularly valu-
able if at some later date they wish to return and claim 
property or open a business – Eritreans abroad are ex-
pected to “voluntarily” pay 2 per cent of their monthly 
salaries to the government.156 This tax is mainly managed 
through local embassies and consulates. Many do pay, but 
increasing numbers, especially of the newly arrived, do not, 
whether because of their economic situations or hostility 
to the regime.157 
More important is the money sent back to family and 
friends. While this is sometimes through official channels 
– Himbol, the government’s official exchange and remit-
tance organisation – increasingly it is done through illegal 
channels in order to bypass the unfavourable official ex-
change rate. As noted above, the hard currency black 
market thrives despite attempts to suppress it, and diaspora 
members have created or tapped into informal networks 
to get desperately-needed money to relatives and friends.158 
The same diaspora whose funds were so important in 
warding off the Ethiopian army thus now uses its re-
sources to support victims of the government’s disastrous 
economic and social policies.159 
Any eventual redistribution of political or economic 
power will need to take account of Eritreans overseas. At 
the same time, however, the diaspora is perhaps more 
divided than ever before. During the liberation struggle, 
it was split in ways that mirrored the ELF-EPLF feud 
within the country, but more recently cleavages have de-
veloped in terms of life experience and aspiration as well 
as political opinion.160 There is broad opposition to the 
government, but some members of the older diaspora 
continue to believe that the regime remains, despite its 
flaws, the best and only option. This is not a view gener-
ally shared by the new generation, which is at most apo-
litical but also has many members who are vehemently 
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opposed to what they unabashedly describe as a military 
dictatorship.161 
The division between these groups is at least partly rooted 
in experience with the regime. Older patterns of loyalty 
reflect an unwillingness to accept that the struggle to which 
so many dedicated their lives has failed. Some also do not 
speak out, even abroad, for fear of reprisals against fam-
ily.162 Eritrean security has increased its presence among 
the diaspora, and the fear of informants is justified. But 
while the presence of so many competing political parties 
and groupings abroad has fragmented opinion, Eritreans 
abroad often share more common ground than they some-
times care to admit. The recent imposition of targeted UN 
Security Council sanctions swiftly led to angry demon-
strations in the diaspora by people who might normally 
be bitterly opposed to the government but were outraged 
that Eritrea was treated in this way.163 To a degree, there-
fore, the sanctions issue plays into Asmara’s hands. 
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162 Tricia Redeker Hepner, “Seeking Asylum in a Transnational 
Social Field: New Refugees and Struggles for Autonomy and 
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V. FOREIGN RELATIONS: PERMANENT 
INTERESTS, ENDURING ENEMIES 
A. REGIONAL RELATIONS AND  
THE ETHIOPIAN WAR 
Contrary to the EPLF’s myths, the war of independence 
was not fought alone and in isolation. The liberation 
fronts developed intricate relations with other political 
organisations and governments across the region and be-
yond. The ELF long enjoyed support from the Arab world 
and at different times had good relations with Egypt and 
Syria among others. It also received succour from Sudan, 
which used the struggle as a means of attacking Ethio-
pia.164 North East Africa in the mid- and late-twentieth 
century experienced a series of inter-connected proxy wars 
in which guerrilla movements were able to take advan-
tage of regional tensions and superpower rivalries. The 
ELF’s vaguely Arab-world tendencies were a cause of 
dissent, and the largely Christian-led EPLF at least partly 
represented a rejection of those connections.165 
The EPLF eschewed external patronage – none was really 
on offer – and made much of its isolation in the northern 
mountains, where it built its military state-in-waiting, un-
sullied by foreign influences. But it was never quite so 
self-sufficient as the subsequent myth would have it; the 
leadership developed pragmatic, and mutually beneficial, 
ties with a range of revolutionary groups in Ethiopia, in-
cluding, for a time, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). It also had an ef-
fective foreign relations department, known as “Protocol”, 
which dealt with journalists, aid workers and other for-
eign visitors to the “liberated areas”.166 It likewise was 
adept at representation in Europe and the U.S. 
Nevertheless, the idea that Eritrea was betrayed by the in-
ternational community and then won independence on its 
own – ignored by the world until it was forced to take no-
tice – was at the heart of the new state’s worldview in the 
early 1990s. At first this was manifest only in a prickli-
ness that was even grudgingly admired by some donors. 
Isaias was not afraid to openly insult his audience, as in 
his first address to the Organisation of African Unity, 
which he rebuked for rarely doing anything constructive 
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(such as supporting Eritrea’s independence struggle).167 
But it was soon clear that this went beyond merely a 
rough-and-ready approach to diplomacy, as Asmara clashed 
with each of its neighbours in the 1990s, culminating in 
the war with Ethiopia. 
Eritrea is not solely to blame for its increasingly difficult 
regional relations. It has had legitimate concerns about 
the intentions of both Ethiopia and Sudan. At times, too, 
it has shown faith in international arbitration and the 
binding character of treaties that has not always been re-
warded. There is a danger of it being made the whipping 
boy in a region where no state’s external dealings are be-
yond reproach. The problem is that Isaias has regularly 
shown a readiness to respond disproportionately to per-
ceived threats and a willingness to abandon diplomacy for 
military adventurism.168 Eritrea has always been prag-
matic externally; but that pragmatism is becoming brutal 
and cynical to the point of diminishing its international 
standing. While national security is indeed a constant 
concern, Isaias’s unwillingness to bend or compromise 
has closed options and led to potentially useful allies be-
ing abandoned and often publicly scorned. 
Relations with Sudan quickly soured after the National 
Islamic Front came to power in Khartoum. Sudan and 
Eritrea hosted one another’s rebel movements – Sudan in 
particular promoting Islamist groups, including Eritrean 
Islamic Jihad, Eritrea facilitating the rebel coalition known 
as the National Democratic Alliance – and cut diplomatic ties 
in 1994. Tensions continued for the rest of the decade.169 
Yemen is another friend turned enemy, and they fought a 
brief but intense war over the Hanish Islands in 1996. The 
dispute was referred to an international tribunal, and both 
parties abided by the ruling.170 There have also been dis-
putes with Djibouti, including minor border clashes in 
1996 and 1998. Relations collapsed during the war with 
Ethiopia, when Eritrea considered Djibouti an Ethiopian 
stooge, and were restored only following the Algiers 
Agreement that ended the major conflict. While the two 
signed cooperation agreements in 2004 and 2006, there 
was once again trouble on the border in 2008 when Eri-
trean forces allegedly occupied a strip of Djibouti’s land 
and fired on its troops. Asmara denied anything had hap-
pened but was censured by the UN Security Council.171 In 
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171 UN Security Council Resolution 1862, 14 January 2009. 
This was an important first step towards imposing sanctions on 
Eritrea. While support for Somali groups was the primary rea-
June 2010, the two governments agreed to resolve the 
dispute through mediation by Qatar.172 
Ethiopia, though traditionally Eritrea’s most valuable 
economic, even strategic partner, is, of course, the coun-
try with which relations have been most fraught. While 
the EPLF and TPLF often cooperated in war against the 
Derg, underlying tensions – over border demarcation, 
military strategy, political vision, and ethnic, nationality 
and identity issues – continued into the 1990s.173 At first, 
their seriousness was not obvious: various agreements were 
signed in 1993, and there was collaboration on a number 
of topics, including banking and defence. But escalating 
border friction, particularly around Badme, followed by 
the pre-agreed introduction of Eritrea’s own national cur-
rency in 1997, led to rapid deterioration in relations.174  
This was a reversion to the confrontational and exclusion-
ist politics of the liberation struggle, a brittle relationship 
made all the more volatile by the historical links between 
highland Eritrea and Tigray – links which both drew the 
regions together and yet also created lines of tension be-
tween them. In addition to past difficulties specific to the 
relationship between the EPLF and the TPLF, moreover, 
there were larger dynamics at work. Elements within the 
new Ethiopia did not truly accept an independent Eritrea, 
at least as shaped by the EPLF;175 while the EPLF’s mili-
tarised view of the region – and of Ethiopia under the 
EPRDF in particular – increased the likelihood of conflict. 
Nonetheless, when the war erupted in May 1998 – fol-
lowing an exchange of fire at Badme and a large-scale 
Eritrean armed response – it came as a surprise to many 
in both countries as well as to most observers. Its scale 
may also have taken Asmara by surprise. Within weeks, 
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fighting spread to several other stretches of border,176 and 
the conflict became a foreign policy and intelligence fail-
ure for Eritrea, much more serious than strained relations 
with Sudan, Yemen or Djibouti. The initial U.S.-Rwanda 
peace plan failed, and fighting continued amid bitter re-
criminations and deportations, mostly of Eritreans from 
Ethiopia. Isaias, in something of a climbdown, indicated 
a willingness to accept the OAU peace plan only in Feb-
ruary 1999, when the Ethiopians recaptured Badme. How-
ever, the war instead entered one of its most destructive 
phases, with fierce combat between April and June along 
the central front, particularly around Zalambessa and 
Tsorona south east of Asmara. 
The Eritreans argued with some justification that Ethio-
pia’s larger war aims had been exposed: not simply the 
recapture of contested border points but the overthrow of 
the government. After June 1999, the war entered another 
relative lull, but the diplomacy of various external actors 
was to no avail. In May 2000, the Ethiopians’ largest offen-
sive smashed Eritrean positions in the western lowlands, 
forcing the army to pull back onto the plateau to positions 
in the hills west of Mendefera and south of Adi Quala 
which were easier to defend. These held, preventing an 
advance toward Asmara and producing a bloody standstill 
by June. An armistice was followed, in December 2000, 
by the Algiers Agreement, which supposedly brought the 
war to a formal end. As events have proved, it has not.177 
UN Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) peace-
keepers sat between the armies in a demilitarised zone for 
the next few years but did not prevent the proliferation of 
proxy wars elsewhere, as both belligerents – but particu-
larly Eritrea – sought to undermine the other. 
It is commonplace to say Eritrea lost the war.178 It did not 
lose it in 2000, however; at that time, neither side was 
able to continue, and while Ethiopia could claim to have 
given Isaias a severe beating, the Eritreans could declare 
that they had warded off Ethiopian aggression. In the 
longer term, nonetheless, the war has proved much more 
devastating for Eritrea, both economically and politically. 
It opened deep rifts within the government and put the 
country on a permanent war-footing, which it could af-
ford neither socially nor economically. But that is only part 
of the story. The regime’s combative style of diplomacy 
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had been a contributing factor to the conflict and left it 
comparatively friendless once the fighting began. More-
over, the experience heightened the feeling in Isaias’s cir-
cle that it was alone in the world and could trust no one, 
not even, it would seem, its own citizens, and it set Eritrea 
on a path of further confrontation. 
However, there was nothing inevitable about this: the 
main problem arose after the Boundary Commission, set 
up as part of the Algiers Agreement, reported its find-
ings in 2002.179 The chief aims of the Algiers Agreement 
included permanent cessation of hostilities; release and 
repatriation of all prisoners and other detainees; and crea-
tion of two neutral bodies, the Boundary and Claims 
Commissions. While the Claims Commission was to as-
sess financial liability for government claims against each 
other, the Boundary Commission was to deal with the 
thorny border question, ostensibly the cause of the war. 
Both governments pledged to accept its findings as bind-
ing. In the event, only Eritrea did so. When it lost Badme 
in the ruling, Ethiopia equivocated, then demanded rene-
gotiation. Asmara refused – and, from a legal standpoint, 
they were correct.180 The international community, in par-
ticular donors and the Security Council, repeatedly failed 
to pressure Ethiopia to comply. Eritrea’s sense of outrage 
heightened, notwithstanding that the Claims Commission 
ruled that it violated international law during its military 
operations in May 1998, in effect, had started the war.181 
The key point is that the Eritreans felt Ethiopia was once 
again being appeased by an international community that 
was tacitly or explicitly hostile to Eritrea. The already 
deep-rooted sense of isolation and betrayal was rein-
forced. Relations with the UN deteriorated rapidly, as the 
regime increasingly placed restrictions on UNMEE, until 
the peacekeepers withdrew, citing a total lack of Eritrean 
cooperation. Unable to complete the actual border demar-
cation, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission under-
took a virtual demarcation, with which Isaias proclaimed 
himself content; but by this time, Eritrean foreign policy 
had taken new directions. 
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B. WAR AS FOREIGN POLICY: ETHIOPIA  
AND BEYOND 
During and after the war with Ethiopia, a network of proxy 
conflicts and furtive military adventures spread rapidly 
across the region, in many respects seemingly taking the 
place of conventional diplomacy.182 Eritrea was not alone 
in this tactic – states throughout the region have at vari-
ous times become involved in proxy wars and rebel 
movements – but it used it with special vigour, owing to 
its ongoing confrontation with Ethiopia. That struggle and 
Isaias’s desire to acquire a pivotal regional role for the 
regime dominate political vision in Asmara. The regime 
routinely denies involvement in most of the conflicts dis-
cussed below, and Isaias readily declares that the border 
issue has been resolved, and he has “no problem” with 
Ethiopia.183 Both assertions are disingenuous. 
While many of these adventures are the outcome of the 
standoff along the border, others predate that conflict and 
have roots in the era of liberation struggle, when inter-
twining conflicts were unavoidable and even desirable. 
For example, Eritrea’s ongoing support for the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) in Ethiopia dates to the 1980s, 
when both fought the Derg. When the OLF resumed its 
insurgency in the mid-1990s, having withdrawn from the 
EPRDF coalition, Asmara was again sympathetic. Simi-
larly, the EPLF also supported the Ogaden National Lib-
eration Front (ONLF) from the mid-1980s and renewed 
that relationship in the mid-1990s, when the ONLF also 
renewed armed struggle. Both Oromo territory and the 
Ogaden have long been fruitful fields of intrigue for an 
Eritrean movement always ready to take advantage of 
opportunities.184 
Opportunism is also evident in EPLF involvement in 
Sudan.185 As relations collapsed in the early 1990s, both 
sides started supporting the other’s rebels. The Sudanese 
backed jihadists against Asmara, and Isaias played a key 
role in bringing a coalition of insurgent groups, including 
the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA) from the 
South and the Beja Congress and Rashaida Free Lions 
from the East, under the National Democratic Alliance 
umbrella. He also sought to enlist Chad’s president, Idris 
Déby, in opening a western front against Khartoum in 
Darfur. That initiative failed, but in 2003, when the Dar-
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fur rebellion erupted, Asmara was quick to offer material 
and logistical support to the main insurgents.186 Eritrean 
“observers” were even stationed in Darfur itself. For a 
time, Asmara was the base for many Darfur and other 
Sudanese rebels and Eritrea a main avenue for weapons 
and supplies.  
Isaias’ true aim was not to resolve Sudan’s wars but to 
gain a dominant regional position and improve his nego-
tiating position with Khartoum. In 2006, he pressured the 
Beja Congress and Rashaida Free Lions to sign a peace 
agreement with Khartoum in exchange for oil and local 
security guarantees187 – a brutally cynical but effective 
move that initiated a thaw in bilateral relations that sacri-
ficed smaller local actors on the alter of national expedi-
ence. Eritrea was less effective in Darfur, largely because 
Sudan proved much too powerful to have its arm twisted 
by Asmara on this issue, and the rebels increasingly had 
other, wealthier patrons. 
It is perhaps in Somalia that the realpolitik justification of 
the proxy war has been most apparent. Eritrea had long 
maintained an interest in Somali affairs, most obviously 
through its support for the Ogaden insurgency, but in-
volvement increased markedly in the early 2000s.188 
Though it actively discouraged the growth of Islamism in 
both the ONLF and various Somali groups, it was none-
theless prepared to strengthen links in pursuit of larger 
regional concerns – chiefly, attacking Ethiopia’s southern 
flank. In particular, the Eritreans developed ties to key 
Islamist leaders within the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), 
which Asmara supported against the Ethiopia-backed 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG).  
By the middle of 2006, the UIC had expelled the TFG 
and allied warlords from Mogadishu and was governing 
southern Somalia more effectively than anyone had since 
the early 1990s, with Eritrea offering advice and some 
material assistance. It was the UIC’s espousal of hard-line 
Islamism and irredentism, which prompted the Ethiopian 
invasion in late 2006.189 Unable to directly confront the 
Ethiopian army, UIC forces dispersed, and the Ethiopians 
occupied Mogadishu and the rest of south and central 
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Somalia. But within weeks an insurgency erupted, with 
continued Eritrean backing. 
The extent of that backing has almost certainly been ex-
aggerated, but there is little doubt that Asmara has given 
local insurgent groups arms and money to fight Ethiopian 
occupation and, after the Ethiopian withdrawal in early 
2009, the new Somali administration.190 Further, it hosted 
the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), a 
coalition of Islamists, warlords and other exiled leaders 
opposed to Ethiopian involvement and the new govern-
ment. The ARS includes individuals on the UN list of 
persons linked to terrorism, including Sheikh Hassan 
Dahir Aweys, and it was associations of this nature that 
culminated in Eritrea’s increasing regional and wider in-
ternational isolation. While some ARS figures took part 
in a reconciliation conference in Djibouti in 2008191 and 
began to return to Somalia – including the current presi-
dent, Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, Eritrea has remained 
bitterly unreconciled to the new order and to anything 
with the Ethiopian or U.S. stamp of approval. 
Eritrea’s obduracy put it on a collision course with much 
of the international community. The Bush administration 
in the U.S. warned that it might be labelled a state spon-
sor of terrorism.192 In an unprecedented step, the African 
Union (AU) called for targeted sanctions on Eritrea for 
alleged support of terrorist groups in Somalia. This was 
aggressively pushed by Uganda, which has peacekeepers 
in Somalia, as well as Ethiopia, and the UN Security Coun-
cil acted in December 2009.193 The sanctions include sus-
pension of military trade links, freezing of assets and 
travel bans on designated individuals found violating the 
arms embargo on Somalia.194 While Eritrea has undoubt-
edly supported elements of the Somali insurgency, there 
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is a powerful sense in Asmara that it has been made a 
scapegoat for others’ failings in that country.195 Certainly, 
Ethiopia bears much greater responsibility for recent dis-
asters in Somalia than Eritrea does. 
It might appear ironic that Asmara would associate with 
Islamists considering its own earlier struggles with Is-
lamic radicalism; but policy on Somalia is consistent with 
the objectives of the long conflict with Ethiopia.196 The 
EPLF has always been prepared to enter short-term alli-
ances in defence of perceived national interests, even when 
doing so appears to damage its international standing. It is 
emboldened at present owing to the anticipated gold bo-
nanza, which it hopes will greatly strengthen its regional 
standing, regardless of other internal economic challenges. 
C. AFRICA AND THE WEST 
These events have also revealed much about Eritrea’s re-
lations with wider Africa, including the regional Inter-
governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the 
AU.197 The call for sanctions originated in IGAD, which 
is dominated by Ethiopia and had reached a consensus on 
Somalia policy, prompting Eritrea to abandon the organi-
sation in 2007.198 But the regime has long been critical, 
indeed contemptuous, of much of what it interprets as going 
on in Africa more broadly. Isaias is especially scornful 
of Western influence, and the media regularly dismisses 
what are described as farcical consensus-building and 
power-sharing arrangements in Zimbabwe and Kenya that 
are seen as appeasement of donors. It also argues that its 
form of government is more honest and realistic than that 
of states on the continent that feel a need to please the 
West with democratic gestures.199 
Eritrea has had solid relations which individual African 
states at particular times – notably Rwanda, Uganda and 
Libya – but it has never been comfortable in the AU. This 
is partly because its headquarters is in Addis Ababa, and 
Ethiopia has always wielded disproportionate influence in 
it. But more generally, the EPLF is convinced that the AU 
(and its OAU predecessor), like the UN, has never sup-
ported it and cannot be trusted.200 As with many of the 
country’s external relationships, this has been something 
 
 
195 Crisis Group analyst’s field notes and interviews in another 
capacity, 2003-2008. 
196 Connell, “The EPLF/PFDJ Experience”, op. cit. 
197 Mengisteab, “What has Gone Wrong”, op. cit., pp. 45-46. 
198 Eritrea had already withdraw from the AU, in November 
2003, when it refused to condemn Ethiopia for not implement-
ing the Border Commission ruling, as required by the Algiers 
Agreement. It returned only in July 2010. 
199 Crisis Group analyst interviews in another capacity, Asmara, 
July 2006, December 2007 and August 2008. 
200 Connell, Against All Odds, op. cit., pp. 282-283. 
Eritrea: The Siege State 
Crisis Group Africa Report N°163, 21 September 2010 Page 24 
 
 
of a self-fulfilling prophecy. Eritrea’s refusal to engage in 
conventional diplomatic networking (something at which 
Ethiopia is skilled), and its officials’ tendency to use 
abrasive, even insulting language,201 have consistently 
damaged relationships that were not necessarily doomed 
from the outset. 
Relations with the West have long been problematic, as 
evidenced locally by interactions with the NGO sector. 
Fierce espousal of self-reliance drew plaudits in the 1990s 
but also led to a clash with some major NGOs.202 The Eri-
trean position was that too much of the budgets of such 
entities went to overhead and that they frequently infringed 
on national sovereignty. The government welcomed fund-
ing but demanded total control over its use. NGO workers 
often mistook pride and sensitivity for hubris and misun-
derstood the traumatic historical context they worked in.203 
In the months before the war in 1998, most NGOs left the 
country, some angrily; after 2000, many were asked to 
return, but the relationship has deteriorated to the point 
where no major NGOs are active. The government says it 
has no use for culturally insensitive, political ignorant 
Western charity, and there is no problem Eritreans cannot 
solve. The breakdown is starkest with human rights or-
ganisations such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch, which are never granted visas; the regime 
is contemptuous of the idea a Western entity would lec-
ture it on internal affairs. 
Nonetheless, the path to the country’s current predica-
ment has not been linear. During the independence strug-
gle, the EPLF may have scorned the notion of superpower 
patrons and converted its relative isolation into a political 
philosophy; but from the early 1990s, the government 
indicated a strong desire for Western alliances. Through 
that decade, relations were reasonably good with the 
U.S.204 The Pentagon in particular saw Eritrea as a strong, 
unitary state in a hostile region, thus a potentially useful 
ally. President Clinton counted both Isaias and Ethiopia’s 
Meles Zenawi as part of Africa’s “renaissance”. Isaias 
undoubtedly saw advantages in such an alliance.205 
After independence, Israel regarded Eritrea as a poten-
tially useful non-Arab, secular and military-minded part-
ner in the Red Sea. The relationship was boosted when a 
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desperately ill Isaias was flown to Israel for medical 
treatment in 1993.206 The Eritrean leadership admired the 
country and saw in its historical and geographical experi-
ence much that was familiar: a highly militarised state, 
surrounded by Arab and Islamist enemies and with an en-
viable combination of relative economic security and a well-
tuned system of national service. A number of agreements 
were signed in the mid-1990s, and the strengthening ties 
complemented Isaias’s pro-U.S. position. He was happy 
to openly insult partners in the Arab world if it meant im-
proved relations, rejected joining the Arab League and 
made clear that he would resist an Arabised Red Sea, 
where, with Eritrean cooperation, Israel maintained a na-
val and military presence.207 
During the war, Eritrea suspected a pro-Ethiopia bias in 
both Israel and the U.S., but the relationships recovered 
for a time. The Israelis continued to see Eritrea as a friend, 
and the U.S. appreciated its support following the 11 Sep-
tember 2001 attacks and again when it (like Ethiopia) 
joined the “coalition of the willing” in the build-up to the 
war in Iraq. But matters soon began to unravel.208 The 
U.S. irritated Isaias by reacting cautiously to an offer of a 
military base, in part because it was not persuaded that 
Eritrea provided the most stable environment. There were 
also growing concerns about Eritrea’s increasingly poor 
human rights record; even the Pentagon was chary about 
full cooperation with such a prickly, apparently trigger-
happy government.209 In the burgeoning war on terror, 
Ethiopia was a more attractive option. 
Eritrea blamed the U.S. in particular for failing to persuade 
Ethiopia to abide by the Boundary Commission ruling. 
By the time the U.S. endorsed (albeit reluctantly) Ethio-
pia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006, relations had reached a 
nadir and descended into public slanging matches.210 
Washington was increasingly irate at the prolonged de-
tention of four Eritrean employees who had worked at its 
Asmara embassy; these individuals, accused of sedition 
and in effect of spying for the U.S., remain in prison.211 
Washington closed Eritrea’s consulate in Oakland, Cali-
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fornia, a financial lifeline between the west-coast dias-
pora and the homeland, and, as noted, threatened to put 
Eritrea on its state sponsors of terrorism list. The arrival 
of the Obama administration has made little difference, 
although at the outset there were several efforts to explore 
a better relationship with Isaias that, U.S. officials said, 
were rebuffed.212 Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and 
other U.S. officials have since issued repeated warnings 
about Asmara’s behaviour in Somalia.213 
The Eritreans are especially angry at the U.S. because 
they feel unreasonably rebuffed and misjudged by the one 
Western power with which they felt they might work 
closely. But ties are similarly poor with the Security 
Council. The UN is seen as a toothless organisation, which 
usually does the bidding of its most powerful members; 
often does nothing at all of significance; and ignores the 
needs of small states. It is condemned for not protecting 
Eritrea in the 1950s and 1960s, then ignoring it once it 
was compelled to turn to violence. Relations have often 
been reasonably good with individual European states, 
notably Italy, Germany and the Scandinavians, but the 
EU – though a major past donor – has clashed with the 
regime over human rights and Somalia. The UK, seen as 
a key ally of Ethiopia and the U.S., is a particular target 
of opprobrium. 
D. CURRENT DIRECTIONS 
Eritrea’s foreign policy can be considered the product of 
its geopolitical position at the southern end of the Red 
Sea, adjacent to a vast, turbulent north-east African hin-
terland and an equally volatile Middle East. Its regional 
relations over twenty years reflect an effort to use to ad-
vantage a strategic location that has often been a curse. 
Modern history has been shaped by the fact that it has 
been fought over by external actors and was a Cold War 
battleground.214 The recent escalation in competition be-
tween Israel and Iran in the Red Sea demonstrates the 
case. Eritrea seems to play a double game, maintaining 
enough of a relationship with Israel, while reaching out to 
that old partner’s nemesis, Iran. Since 2008, Eritreans and 
Iranians have agreed to collaborate on vague economic 
and cultural projects; ambassadors have been exchanged, 
and talk abounds of an Iranian presence in some form around 
Assab. Asmara denies any Iranian military presence in 
the area; an Iranian interest in the Assab oil refinery is 
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more likely.215 Israel is alarmed, and Eritrea presumably 
hopes to benefit from a standoff in the southern waters of 
the Red Sea.216 It is a dangerous game. 
Other relationships appear more conventional, aimed at 
developing badly-needed commercial links and diplo-
matic support. Libya, Qatar and China, for example, have 
each in their way and for different reasons been willing to 
cooperate. The regime is seeking to recoup a decade and 
more of foreign policy losses. While some of these losses 
are the result of its own mistakes, not all are. 
The EPLF’s foreign policy is dominated by a political 
culture characterised by deep-seated militarism, in inter-
nal as well as external dealings, suspicion of outsiders, 
however defined, and long cycles of violence in the re-
gion.217 It is the result also of chronic disunity that has char-
acterised politics over a half-century and which the EPLF 
has sought to resolve once and for all. This isolationist 
and angry political culture is rooted in the perceptions 
of past betrayal and the brutal, uncompromising nature 
of the liberation struggle. For the EPLF to overcome that 
aspect of its inheritance would have required a degree of 
imagination and flexibility of which the current leadership 
seems incapable. But similar imagination and flexibility 
are needed by the international community when dealing 
with that leadership. 
The EPLF also has had to contend with the special status 
Ethiopia enjoys as the region’s powerhouse, the focus of 
international attention and (on the whole) favour. Asmara 
has not always helped itself in terms of image abroad;218 
but there is logic in its pursuit of particular goals, and its 
regional wars and interventions need to be understood in 
those terms. Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti and Ethiopia are 
Eritrea’s backyard. While the EPLF’s responses to the 
foreign policy opportunities and challenges they present 
are usually militaristic in nature, there is a thin line be-
tween insecurity and arrogance, and Eritrea exhibits both. 
The international community erred seriously in 2002 in 
not putting greater pressure on Ethiopia to fully imple-
ment the Boundary Commission’s findings. Asmara’s re-
sulting perception that the world is behind Ethiopia, no 
matter what it does, is one of the most dangerous sources 
of instability in the region today. 
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Just a decade ago, Eritrea might reasonably have been de-
scribed as challenged but stable; today it is under severe 
stress, if not yet in full-blown crisis and the basic stability 
on which the government has relied for so long is increas-
ingly illusory. While Eritrea is not likely to undergo dra-
matic upheaval in the near future, it is weakening steadily. 
Its economy is in freefall, the expected gold boom not-
withstanding, poverty is rife, and the authoritarian politi-
cal system is haemorrhaging its legitimacy in the eyes of 
millions. Sovereignty is being compromised from within – 
in terms of the flight of Eritreans from the country and 
the withdrawal of support for the regime – in what is po-
tentially a graver long-term crisis for the regime than 
even the 1998-2000 war. It is a question of when, not if 
change comes; Eritrea cannot continue on its trajectory 
without serious worsening of current problems, which 
would open fissures in the socio-economic and political 
landscape. Income anticipated from gold production will 
likely not be used to restore the ailing domestic economy 
but rather to enhance military capacity, with dangerous 
regional implications. 
President Isaias shows no willingness to modify his au-
thoritarian stance, and there is little prospect of internal 
reform. If anything, the regime can be expected to inten-
sify repression in the face of growing disengagement by 
the population and greater opposition outside the country. 
Increased international isolation, and in particular diffi-
culties with immediate neighbours, will, if the past is a 
good basis for judging, be used to justify continued mili-
tary mobilisation. The opposition in exile can be expected 
to gain strength over time and pose a more coherent threat 
to the regime. Whether it can form a convincing govern-
ment in waiting remains to be seen, as does whether the 
members of the main opposition coalition can overcome 
serious differences. If there is not a cogent, united opposi-
tion, regional, ethnic and religious groupings might emerge 
around particular parties and sectional interests, which 
could potentially be catastrophic for national unity. Young 
Muslims are a possible source of serious opposition, 
awaiting only mobilisation. 
More broadly, the bulk of the population is disengaged 
from the state, but although there is no open protest, the 
government cannot take this for granted over the long 
term. Eritreans are famously long suffering; but the armed 
liberation struggle was the product of desperation, and the 
same could happen again if the current situation contin-
ues. Increasingly angry and anxious citizens cannot be 
expected to maintain their silence much longer, especially 
if economic conditions continue to deteriorate. The coun-
try is full of increasingly desperate young men with ac-
cess to guns, thus potentially a force for sudden change. 
At present, protest manifests itself only in illegal flight 
from the country, but a point may soon be reached when 
anger is turned inward toward the state itself. 
A professional core of the Eritrean Defence Forces remains 
loyal, either to Isaias himself or to particular generals. As 
long as the president and the generals need one another, 
that core will remain loyal to the state, but the situation 
will become more complex if their relationship begins to 
break down. The army has for some time been the key 
stabilising force in Eritrea, indeed the focal point of the 
EPLF’s social engineering project, but it is becoming less 
stable, riddled with corruption and increasingly weak in 
terms of trained men, adequate equipment and morale. 
Conscripts are underpaid, undernourished and deeply 
frustrated. National service could well prove one of the 
catalysts for the regime’s eventual collapse. Some form of 
demobilisation is urgently needed but cannot happen over-
night, as society and the economy are incapable of absorb-
ing tens of thousands of former soldiers without serious 
upheaval. A holistic approach to economic development 
and demobilisation is crucial and requires outside help. 
There is a clear relationship between Eritrea’s militarised 
foreign policy and its brand of domestic authoritarianism. 
The government claims that the tough neighbourhood it 
lives in and the consequent security threats require con-
stant and pro-active vigilance and thus a high degree of 
mobilisation. It is not wholly wrong in this, and though it 
overstates the case and seriously overreacts to its situa-
tion, it is inadequate and unhelpful to portray Eritrea as 
the regional spoiler. It is the product of the political envi-
ronment of the Horn as a whole. Ultimately, everything is 
interconnected, and a more comprehensive, integrated ap-
proach is needed by the international community to treat 
the severe problems confronting Eritrea and the region. 
It would be folly to push the regime into a corner: isola-
tion might well embolden Ethiopia while fuelling Isaias’s 
determination to wage war by other means and prove 
he was right all along about the international community. 
On the other hand, political and economic engagement – 
based on a clear-eyed assessment that conditions aid and 
improved trade to long-promised national elections and 
implementation of the long-delayed constitution but also 
on greater understanding of Eritrea’s past and current 
grievances, particularly with Ethiopia, might just remove 
one of the regime’s key rationales and ultimately empower 
more reform-minded and outward-looking elements 
within the PFDJ and wider Eritrean society. 
Nairobi/Brussels, 21 September 2010
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ARS Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia 
AU African Union 
Derg Amharic for “committee” or “council”, shorthand for the socialist regime in Ethiopia, 1974-1987 
EDF Eritrean Defence Forces 
EIJ Eritrean Islamic Jihad 
ELF Eritrean Liberation Front 
ELM Eritrean Liberation Movement 
EPLF Eritrean People’s Liberation Front 
EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
EPRP Eritrean People’s Revolutionary Party 
IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
NDA National Democratic Alliance 
NIF National Islamic Front 
OAU Organisation of African Unity 
OLF Oromo Liberation Front 
ONLF Ogaden National Liberation Front 
PFDJ People’s Front for Democracy and Justice 
SPLA Sudan People’s Liberation Army 
TFG Transitional Federal Government 
TPLF Tigray People’s Liberation Front 
UIC Union of Islamic Courts 
UNMEE United Nations Mission to Ethiopia and Eritrea 
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